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Some Observations and Proposals on
the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment

RONALD J. BACIGAL*

The well-recognized lack of consistency and clarity in fourth amendment1 decisions 2 results from a judicial failure to articulate the underlying principles of the fourth amendment.3 Without clearly
articulated principles, courts are unable to discern legally material
distinctions among the varying factual situations.4 One unaddressed
question is whether the fourth amendment should be viewed from an
• B.S., 1964, Concord College; J.D., 1967, Washington & Lee University. Professor
of Law, University of Richmond. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. E.g, Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of
Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1916 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1193, 1197
(1976): ''The Supreme Court has consistentl7 failed to articulate a fully satisfactory
framework for Fourth Amendment analysis.' See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendmen~ 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47, 50 (1974). See also Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L. J. 329, 329 (1973);
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ••. Has Not ••. Run Smooth,"
1966 U. !LL. L.F. 255 (title quoting Frankfurter, J., concurring in Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961)).
3. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 49.
4. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 254 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(every factual situation contains considerations that are "not easily quantified and,
therefore, not easily weighed one against the other"). See also Dworkin, supra note 2;
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
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individual perspective, which emphasizes protection of the interests
of individual citizens, or from a limitation perspective, which emphasizes the regulation of governmental conduct.5 The individual perspective focuses only on the target6 of the search and governmental
action taken with respect to that subject. The motives of the government officials are irrelevant.7 Motives are important, however, to the
limitation perspective.8
The individual perspective and the limitation perspective are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, but selection of one over
the other often can produce different legal results. The timed or pretext arrest problem illustrates the divergence of these two models. 9
For example, the police suspect that a student is hiding marijuana in
his locker. Rather than obtain a search warrant, the police arrest the
student when he is using his locker so they can search the locker
incident to the arrest. 10 From the individual perspective, the invasion of the student's property and privacy interests remains the same
regardless of the motivation for the search. From the limitation perspective, however, acceptability of the search depends on the legitimacy of the government official's purpose and motive. When the
government's purpose is to arrest the student wherever he is found,
chance determines whether the police will search the locker. If the
purpose behind the timing and location of the arrest is to search the
locker, the government has consciously exercised its power to search.
The limitation perspective permits more stringent limitations on
planned warrantless searches than on governmental activity inadvertently resulting in a search.11
The Supreme Court has not expressly acknowledged the existence
of a choice of perspectives,12 but has apparently adopted the individ5. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment; 58 MrnN. L. REV. 349, 367
(1974); Weinreb, supranote 2, at 68. These two views are not limited to fourth amendment jurisprudence. The atomistic and regulatory perspectives can also be applied to
the fifth and sixth amendments, and to the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. See generally Amsterdam, supra; Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect:
Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MrnN. L. REV. 47 (1964); Grano,
Kirby, Biggers, & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger
of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 719 (1974).
6. In this article, the terms "target" and "target individual" refer to the individual
whose person, house, papers or effects are searched or seized by the government.
7. Of course, the motivation or intent of the police could be relevant to the individual perspective, if the individual's right were defined as a right to be free of planned
warrantless searches. Such a definition of the individual's right encompasses the limitation perspective.
8. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971).
9. This problem arises when a police officer having valid grounds for arrest times it
so that search-incident-to-arrest powers can be invoked, thereby avoiding the warrant
requirement. See, e.g, Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314 (5th Cir.
1968); United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1963) (Boyd, J., dissenting);
Taglavore v. United States, 291F.2d262, 266-67 (9th Cir.1961); Adairv. State, 427 S.W.2d
67, 72 (Tex. Crim. 1968) (Onion, J., dissenting).
10. To be searched mcident to arrest, the locker would have to be an "area 'within
(the arrestee's] immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
11. Justice Marshall has indicated that he would regard the intent of the officers in a
timed arrest as the controlling factor. "When an arrest is so timed that it is no more
than an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement, I would hold the subsequent
arrest or search unlawful." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 49 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 455-57.
12. Professor Amsterdam feels that the Court has consciously chosen not to address
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ual perspective13 by frequently emphasizing that fourth amendment
rights are personal rights. 14 The limitation perspective, however, underlies the development of the fourth amendment15 and occasionally
appears in Supreme Court opinions.16 Because decisions in fourth
amendment cases may depend on the perspective employed by the
court, the limitation perspective should be explicitly exainined to determine its proper role in resolving fourth amendment questions.17
This article will analyze the fourth amendment from both the individual and limitation perspectives, and evaluate the desirability of
each as a determinant of the reach of fourth amendment protection
in specific situations. The individual perspective alone is an inadequate model to evaluate all interests relevant to fourth amendment
problems.18 Conjunctive use of both perspectives, however, allows a
complete and balanced analysis of the fourth amendment, and can
eliminate the need to ponder such difficult questions as which expectations of privacy are socially justifiable and when an individual has
waived his privacy rights. Although an accommodation between the
the question of whether the fourth amendment should be viewed from the individual
or limitation perspective. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 352-53.
13. The concepts of "standing" and ''taint" of a constitutional violation are largely
r.remised upon the individual perspective. Chief Justice Burger recently noted that
'[b) oth these limitations on the use of the exclusionary rule are inconsistent with its
deterrent rationale." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 n.4 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Although the Chief Justice was specifically concerned with the exclusionary rule, the Court has invoked the "standing" requirement when the target seeks a
remedy other than exclusion of evidence to protect his privacy from general surveillance. See, e.g. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.1 (1972). "[Mlany times the Court has denied
standing and limited the scope of the amendment by saying that the defendant's
fourth amendment rights are not involve.d when it really meant that the exclusionary
rule would not be applied or the search and seizure was reasonable." Knox, Some
Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches
and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 47 (1975). See also note 192 infra.
The Supreme Court has been more willing to adopt the limitation perspective when
it causes contraction of fourth amendment protections. E.g. South Dakota v. Opperman, 425 U.S. 909 (1976); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In such cases the Court
"limits the requirement of a warrant to the small number of cases in which government officials plan to initiate contact with the person for the primary purpose of making a search." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 79 (emphasis added). See alsoBacigal, The
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendmen~ 9 U. Rica. L. REV. 249 (1975); notes
224-311 infra and accompanyin~ text.
14. See, e.g. Alderman v. Umted States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
15. See notes 194-204 infra and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (warrantless
search of car held unreasonable because police had ample opportunity to obtain warrant, knew in advance the car's precise location, and intended to seize it when they
entered the property}; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971) (caseworker's home
visit held not an unreasonable intrusion under the fourth amendment, because the
investigatory technique was "a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and
considerate application").
17. Althou~h volumes have been written on the fourth amendment as perceived
from the individual perspective, see notes 37-44 infra, the limitation perspective has
been almost ignored. But see Dworkin, supra note 2; Mascolo, The Ro1e of Functional
Observation in the Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DICK. L.
REV. 379 (1967).
18. Considering the limitation perspective as a distinct, theoretical alternative to the
privacy analysis, however, does bring to light interests that the individual privacy approach ignores: society's interest in controlling secret agents, for example. See notes
146-73 infra and accompanying text.
,,.n1

two perspectives is desirable, the latter part of this article disregards
questions of individual rights in order to develop a tentative model
exemplifying the use of the limitation perspective in fourth amendment problems.

The Individual Perspective: The Right to Privacy and the
Myth of Assumption of Risk
The individual perspective has dominated the history and development of the fourth amendment. The history of the fourth amendment can be traced to the Magna Charta,19 Roman law, and the
Bible.20 The individual right enjoying the longest and strongest support is the right to property, especially property rights in a dwelling
house.21 The Supreme Court employed the fourth amendment to expand this concept to protect personal and property security in "constitutionally protected area [ s] .22 Prior to Katz v. United States,23 the
Court limited the scope of the amendment's protection to certain special places.24 This emphasis on property and physical trespass25
culminated in Olmstead v. United States, 26 in which the Court held
that a wiretap of private telephone lines did not violate the fourth
amendment because the telephone messages were not tangible property that could be seized.27 Absent physical entry into a constitutionally protected place, no entry and thus no search occurred.28
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, criticized the majority for emphasizing
property rights and for ignoring the individual's right to be free from
19. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States (pt. 1), 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 281 (1968).
20. ''The famous maxim 'every man's house is his castle' cited by Coke, 5 Rep. 92,
and generally regarded as a peculiarly English privile~e, comes directly from the Roman law. Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet But ... it would seem that the concept
far antedates that body of law." N. LAssoN, THE HlsTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 15 n.9 (1937). The author
traces the concept to Hebrew law and.the Bible. Id at 13-14. Lord Pitt, opposing general warrants, probably made the most famous statement regarding the sanctity of a
dwelling house:
The poorest man mar., in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter;
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Quoted in·id at 49-50. .
21. The "hue and cry" whereby all able-bodied males were to join in the search for
the criminal was one of the earliest forms of official search in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. But even while in hot ~ursuit, the search party had to proceed cautiously onto a
man's curtilage, due to the high regard for the owner's privilege to be undisturbed in
the peaceful occupancy of his home. Stengel, supra note 19, at 280. See also
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 note c (K.B. 1604).
22. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (opinion by Justice Stewart).
One year later Justice Stewart declared in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967), that the fourth amendment "protects people not places."
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. See, e.g, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (automobiles); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel rooms); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garages); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (sealed packages).
25. ''The law of search and seizure has been interwoven, in historical context, with
the requirement of trespassory intrusion. Attaching to the search process the requirement of a trespassory intrusion of necessity elinlinates therefrom all activity that does
not involve or include such intrusion." Mascolo, supra note 17, at 414.
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
27. Id at 466.
28. Id at 464.
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governmental intrusion.29
Criticism of Olmstead intensified as the years passed.30 The Court
subsequently extended the amendment's protection to such intangibles as conversations,31 and eventually overruled Olmstead and
abandoned the physical trespass requirement in Katz v. United
States.3 2 Katz held that electronic surveillance of a person in a telephone booth violated the privacy on which the person justifiably relied and thus violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure.33 If the Court in Katz had held
only that physical trespass is unnecessary to fourth amendment violations,34 the error of Olmstead would have been corrected and the
courts would have continued to concern themselves with defining a
"constitutionally protected area." Katz not only determined the
means by which the fourth amendment may be violated, but also examined the scope of the amendment. The short an~wer given in
Katz-that the amendment "protects people, not places"35-is only
the starting point for analysis and not the answer itself.36 The majority opinion failed to delineate the contours of the right of privacy or
29. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the si~cance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They- knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 478. Justice Brandeis' invocation of a right to be let alone and his attack upon
the view that the fourth amendment :protects only property resurrected the prior broad
view of the amendment enunciated m Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
30. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 212, 218-35.
.
31. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
·
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[O)nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id at 353. See also
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). One commentator has suggested
that the right to privacy reco~ed in Katz is itself a "notion drawn largely from property law" that has "imported mto search and seizure anomalous rigidities derived from
private property law." Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows
on the Fourth Amendmen~ 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 664, 666-67 (1961). See also note 34 infra.
33. 389 U.S. at 353.
34. Commentators have noted that despite Justice Stewart's pronouncement in
Katzthat the fourth amendment "protects people not places," courts remain preoccupied with physical privacy and constitutionally protected areas. See Amsterdam,
supra note 5, at 383; Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property
Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Weinreb, supra note 2, at 52-54.
35. See note 22 supra.
36. 389 U.S. at 351. One writer has suggested that the Katz opinion is "intentionally
ambiguous, pointing the war to a new scope for the Fourth Amendment while leaving
the Court room to retreat.' Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendmen~ 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 138. See also Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 385
(''the Katz decision was written to resist captivation in any formula").
1A7Rl

explain when and why an individual is justified in relying on this
right.
Despite the warning in Katz that ''the Fourth Amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,' " 37 fourth
amendment litigation since Katz has centered on the privacy issue.38
The origin and constitutional basis of the right to privacy are unclear,39 and articulation of the scope and content of the right has
proved extremely diffi.cult.40 Courts have invoked the privacy right
in several areas outside the fourth amendment,41 but attempts by social scientists42 and the courts43 to define the right have been unsuccessful. Definitional problems may arise because the right to
privacy is not one right but many discrete rights, some of which are
interrelated, while others are unrelated or inconsistent.44
Even a clear definition of privacy45 would not determine the extent
to which constitutional protection is desirable or the weight to be assigned to the privacy right in competition with other social and political values. The Court has recently rejected an absolutist view of
privacy by declining to place certain items of evidentiary value beyond the reach of a search that meets the procedural requirements of
the fourth amendment.46 Thus, any privacy interest47 might be out37. 389 U.S. at 350.
38. One comment observes that "[t]he greatest misfortunes befalling the right of
privacy as a constitutional doctrine are its name and birth." Doss & Doss, On Morals,
Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 418 (1971). But ef.Beaney, supra
note 30, at 215: ''The nearest to an explicit recognition of a right to privacy in the Constitution is contained in the Fourth Amendment."
39. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 228-29
(1965).
40. "[T]he content of the right remains elusive, the constitutional sources from
which it springs are vaguely charted, and the remedies for its vindication remain
largely ephemeral." Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 26 REC. N.Y.B.A. 546, 547 (1971).
41. E.g. Rowe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (abortion); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (pandering advertisement); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949) (sound trucks). See generally Doss & Doss, supra note
38; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
42. A. WESTIN, PruvACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
43. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970).
44. E.g. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1961) (absence of chilling
effect on free speech and press); A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 7 (the right "of individuals, grou:ps, or mstitutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others"); Dykstra, "The Right Most Valued
by Civilized Man," 6 UTAH L. REV. 305, 307 (1959) (''mental and spiritual
development ••• happiness, peace of mind, the proper unfolding of personality"); Ervin, The Final Answer: The People in Control, 7 TRIAL 14, 28 (March/April 1971) (freedom from "a climate of apprehension and fear of 'snoopers'-private or official");
Parker, Definition ofPrivacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280 (1974) ("control over who can
sense us"); Rossiter, The Pattern ofLiberty, in AsPECTS OF LIBERTY 17 (M. Konvitz & C.
Rossiter eds. 1958) (the right to "erect an unbreachable wall of digruty and reserve
against the entire world").
45. ''The legal process places limits on the sublety and sophistication of the definitions it uses•••• [T]he law needs some short, commonly agreed upon definition of
privacy." Parker, supra note 44, at 277-78.
46. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Andresen raised the question left
open in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967): "whether there are items of evidential
value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search
and seizure." Id at 303. Andresen apparently answers this question in the negative
by holding that a search and seizure is constitutional when the government observes
the procedural requirements of the fourth amendment and avoids compulsion under
the fifth amendment by ensuring that ''the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence." 427 U.S. at 474.
47. The broad language of Andresenimplies that no items, even personal diaries, are
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weighed by a competing governmental interest, such as the government's interest in ferreting out crime.
Shifting emphasis from a pure individual perspective to an analysis
integrating both perspectives would make the determinations in particular cases less complex. Balancing recognized privacy rights
against other interests48 as dictated by the integrated approach requires the government to establish probable cause for intruding upon
a recognized right to privacy.49 The prior and more difficult task required by Katz, however, is balancing interests to determine whether
the expectation of privacy is justified.50 If the expectation is not justified, the fourth amendment is inapplicable and an inquiry into
probable cause is unnecessary.51 Although the Katz majority failed
to explain why the defendant had ''justifiably relied" on the privacy
of the telephone booth and to delineate standards for a justifiable expectation of privacy,52 Justice Harlan, concurring, suggested that the
expectation of privacy must be both subjective and reasonable.53
The Court soon abandoned the subjective expectation requirement,
because the individual defendant is unlikely to have considered the
privacy question,54 and currently employs only the reasonable expectation test to determine the applicability of the fourth amendment.55
A standard for justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy remains unelucidated. Courts should not entrust this determination to
the jury because jurors are generally unfamiliar with police search
and seizure practices.56 The reasonable man standard is also troublesome in this context because it often requires the fact-finder to hypothesize about the expectations of the reasonable criminal and to
consider the defendant's illegal activity in determining whether an
so private that they are beyond the search and seizure powers of the government. The
items seized in Andresen were business records, however, and thus the status of personal diaries remains uncertain. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the
Court stated: "Special problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a
personal diary ... are not involved here." Id at 401 n.7.
48. See Ervin, supra note 44, at 28 (suggesting that efficiency and economy values
should be balanced with privacy and constitutional freedom values).
·
49. See, e.g, Wong Sun v. United States, 371U.S.471 (1963); Malloryv. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
50. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
51. See e.g, United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1135 (1974). Once the court classifies the government action as a "nonsearch," meaning
that no intrusion upon interests protected by the fourth amendment has occurred, "it
is of course of no consequence whether or not there was probable cause." 484 F .2d at
380 n.5.
52. Katz "offers neither a comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage nor
any positive principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved."
Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 385.
53. 389 U.S. at 361.
54. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
55. Id Even Harlan had second thoughts about the requirement for a subjective
expectation of privacy that he had suggested in Katz. Id at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. See Dworkin, supranote 2, at 365-66.
1Q7Al

expectation of privacy is reasonable.57 These problems induced the
Court to state that "one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police."58 This
position imposes a required expectation on wrongdoers rather than
reflecting what they actually or reasonably expect. The result is a
moral judgment that wrongdoers are not justified in expecting privacy.59
Even if courts could resist the temptation to invoke moral justifications, the major inadequacy of exclusive reliance on the reasonably
prudent man standard is that the standard merely reflects existing
conditions without considering their desirability.60 The government
can unilaterally change existing conditions and thus the expectations
of reasonably prudent men.61 If the fourth amendment is to protect
the right to privacy at all, it must consider what citizens have-a right
to expect rather than society's current expectations. A public opinion poll cannot define social justification and reasonable expectation.
Courts must assess the effect that the government activity would
have on individuals and society absent constitutional restraints.62
The Katz test thus requires a court to determine which privacy
claims will receive fourth amendment protection rather than what
the individual subjectively expects, or what the reasonably prudent
man expects.63 Deciding which interests are protected by the fourth
amendment requires a value judgement and thus requires courts to
determine which expectations of privacy are desirable and therefore
justifiable.64 When a court addresses these questions, satisfactory
57. Another obvious temptation is to consider the effect of the exclusionary rule in
determining whether the fourth amendment protections apply. See generally Hufstedler, supra note 40.
58. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). By focusing on the
expectations of one contemplating illegal activities the analysis begs the question "by
usmg a later determination of criminaliW to justify the government's earlier activity
which made the determination possible.' Dworkin, supra note 2, at 337.
59. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 337.
60. The task of the law is ''to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect," and the
Court should not "merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society." United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 384. See, e.g. United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929,
932 (9th Cir. 1973), holding that because the government had posted signs informing
passengers that they would be searched before boarding an airplane, an individual
choosing to board a :plane relinquished any.reasonable expectation that he would not
be searched. C.f.Uruted States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir.1973) ("The government could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all telephone lines would be tapped, or that all homes would be searched.").
62. Stone, supra note 2, at 1219.
63. Of course even before Katz the courts had to choose which places and things
were within the coverage of the fourth amendment. Determining the existence of a
right of privacy in tangible things was not as difficult as the present question, however,
because the courts had recourse to longstanding property principles. While property
rights in intangibles are also recognized by property law, such rights are not as clearly
defined by legal precedent. When the Katz opinion announced that the fourth amendment protects people not places, see note 22 supra, thus necessitating a determination
of what privacy people may justifiably expect, the courts had no ready reservoir of
precedents to guide them. Commentators have suggested various tests, see, e.g,
Kitch, supranote 36, at 137 ("society's generally shared expectations"); Parker, supra
note 44, at 276 ("our shared intuition of when privacy is or is not gained or lost"); Stone
supra note 2, at 1212 (concern with ''relatively serious" threats to privacy); Weinreb,
supra note 2, at 83 (claims that are "natural or essential").
64. This ''uncomfortable position" of iden~g basic rights and desirable social
values is not unique to fourth amendment Jurisprudence. According to Justice

536

(VOL.

46:529

Nature of the Fourth Amendment
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

answers are unlikely because the court must choose between the
equally important social interests in the right of privacy and the need
for effective law enforcement. As long as courts are forced to choose
one of these values over the other, fourth amendment law will remain
unsettled.65
Faced with the difficult task of reconciling conflicting social values,
courts have abrogated their responsibility by applying an irregular
version of the assumption of risk doctrine. The courts have created
the fiction that the individual determines which expectations of privacy are desirable and therefore deserving of fourth amendment protection. Reasoning that the right to privacy can be waived, courts
routinely conclude that an individual did not want privacy in a given
situation.66 This analysis obviates speculation on the existence of
the right had the defendant actually sought it. Under this formulation, the issue resembles a consent or waiver determination.67 The
courts have eschewed traditional requirements for waiver or consent,
however, and have created a peculiar version of the assumption of
risk doctrine.
This article will analyze the Court's decisions using the assumption
of risk doctrine in three factual settings involving the following hypothetical situation: John and Mary have an. adulterous relationship.
John wishes to conceal this relationship from his spouse, respectable
society, and especially the government, because adultery is a crime.
To protect the secrecy of this "private" relationship, John never appears with Mary in public. Their contact is confined to telephone
conversations and meetings in an isolated mountain cabin, to w:pjch
they come and go separately~ They never appear outside the cabin
together. John is arrested and prosecuted for adultery.
John is dismayed to find that the government will offer the following evidence: (1) testimony that government observation of John for
the past year demonstrates that he made twenty trips from his home
to the cabin; (2) testimony by a government forest ranger who has
Holmes, the judicial function necessarily and properly involves "considerations of
what is expedient for the community concerned.' 0. W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 35
(1923). See, e.g. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765 (1969), where the
court balanced the public's interest in apprehending defendants engaging in homosexual activities in public restrooms against the individual's interest in not being watched
while relieving himself. The court held that the interest in privacy must be
"subordinated to the_public interest in law enforcement." Id at 447, 170 S.E.2d at 766.
65. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950). While a certain amount of ''unstable equilibrium" may be
viewed as the virtue of flexibility, "consistency and predictability are virtues too, and
they must be sacrificed to achieve flexibility." Dworkin, supra note 2, at 365. Undue
emphasis on flexibility and the factual setting of each case undermines the fourth
amendment as a means of regulating the police, since police officers cannot be expected to conform their conduct to unannounced, unpredictable norms. See notes 24649 infra and accompanying text. See generally Dworkin, supra note 2; LaFave, supra
note 4.
66. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 183 (1969).
67. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 54.
10'7Q1

observed, through an unshuttered window, John and Mary engaging
in sexual relations inside the cabin (the forest ranger made these observations through infrared binoculars from a nearby mountain
which is part of a government park); (3) John's diary, containing entries concerning his relationship with Mary, seized during a search of
the cabin (government agents conducted the search after obtaining
the consent of John's business partner, who shared use of the cabin
with John); (4) tapes of John and Mary's telephone conversations obtained using a wiretap, without court authorization, but with Mary's
consent; and (5) Mary's testimony about John's bedroom conversations with her, Mary disclosing that she has been an undercover police agent since the age of nine.
John may be dismayed at the government's efficiency in collecting
this evidence. He may be further dismayed to learn that all of the
evidence is probably admissible. But he will be stunned to learn
that it is admissible because he is deemed to have no desire that
these matters be private. Notwithstanding his subjective desire for
privacy, and the reasonableness of the precautions he took to conceal
his relationship with Mary, the court will inform him that he waived
any claim of privacy and assumed the risk that he was under government surveillance, that the ranger would look through his unshuttered window, that his business partner would consent to a seizure of
his diary, that Mary would consent to a wiretap, and that Mary was
actually a government spy.
Private and Public Places
Courts employ the distinction between private and public places to
determine how much privacy an individual retains when he leaves a
private place and enters a public place and how much privacy an individual retains when he "invites" the public into an otherwise private place.68 John's use of a public highway en route to the cabin
exemplifies the entry of a public place. His failure to shutter the
cabin windows exemplifies an "invitation" to the public to enter a
private place.
Going Into Public Places
Dicta in Katz89 and other cases70 recognizes that a person's desire for
privacy may be constitutionally protected even in a public place.
Nevertheless, the courts generally limit fourth amendment protection to public places ''where the physical arrangement creates an ex68. 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in bis own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
69. Id at 351-52 ("[W]hat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally r.rotected.").
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) ( 'This inestimable right of personal security
belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted
in his study to dispose of his secret affairs."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977) ("a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals
from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home").
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pectation of privacy."71 The courts have been less willing to
determine whether the right to privacy exists in a public area lacking
the physical characteristics of private places.72 Terry v. Ohfo73 established that an individual retains some privacy in his person and
tangible property even while on a public street. The stop and frisk
procedure considered by the Court in Terry also constitutes a trespass and a seizure under the "means-oriented" approach of
Olmstead.74 Under Olmstead, the fourth amendment does not apply
absent a physical trespass.75 The Katz ''justifiable expectation of
privacy" approach, on the other hand, fails to indicate unambiguously whether the fourth amendment applies to governmental activities that do not constitute a physical trespass, such as surveillance in
public places. Many courts76 and commentators77 have concluded
that the constitution does not reach all acts of public surveillance by
the government.
The Court suggested in Katz, however, that physical trespass is
unnecessary to place public searches within the fourth amendment.
The test for a justifiable expectation of privacy is whether a particular expectation is desirable in this society, not what the reasonably
prudent man,78 or a specific individual, expects.79 This value judg71. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 84. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal 3d 884, 891-92, 506
P.2d 232, 236-37, 106 Cal Rptr. 408, 412-13 (1973) (expectation of privacy in public restroom despite doorless toilet stall); ef.Kirsch v. State, 10 Md. App. 565, 569, 271A.2d770,
772 (1970) (no expectation of privacy in locked service station restroom). Katz speaks
of the defendant excluding the uninvited ear by closing the door. 389 U.S. at 352. Regarding the right to privacy in public restroom compartments see generally 55 MINN. L.
REV. 1255 (1971); 19 VAND. L. REV. 945 (1966); 63 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1963).
72. E.g, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Army information-gathering ''relating to
potential or actual civil disturbances or street demonstrations"); Giancana v. Hoover,
322 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1963); Scherer v. Brennan, 266 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. ID. 1966), afj'd,
379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967). Although the Supreme Court has recognized an mdividual's ''right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home," Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969), ''the Court did not explain why the
situs •.• made an~ difference in the state's power to interfere with [the individual's}
satisfying his emotional needs or in its power to tell him what he should read or view. '
Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 560.
73. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
75. 277 U.S. at 464; see Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765)
("[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass."), quoted inBoyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-29 (1886). Contra, United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306,
313 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("In every-day talk, as of 1789 or now, a man
'searches' when he looks or listens."), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
76. E.g, Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[I)t is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to observe in a public place that
which is apparent for all the world to see."), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965).
77. "Surely, an individual cannot reasonably expect to be free from observation. It
seems unassailable that the courts will always affirm what the logic here demands-that a police officer be allowed, indeed be expected, to patrol and· observe
what transpires in areas fully open to the public." Belair & Bock, Police Use of Remote
Camera Systems for Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.143,
191 (1972). See Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom, 47 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 871, 889 n.78 (1972) (proposing statutory rather than constitutional limitations
on surveillance).
78. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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ment requires balancing society's need for information80 against the
harm of placing surveillance beyond fourth amendment coverage.
The individual perspective indicates that surveillance interferes with
the right of privacy if privacy encompasses the concept of anonymity.
The concept of anonymity recognizes that most people spend part
of their lives in public.81 Although some observation is inevitable in
public places, the individual observed nevertheless distinguishes between systematic surveillance and casual observation.82 In an urban
society, therefore, anonymity replaces privacy. The urbanite merges
into the "situational landscape."83 Although surveillance of the individual qua individual clearly destroys anonymity, the social costs of
this destruction are unclear. Everyone has probably experienced
the vague, uneasy feeling of being watched, especially when he is unable to watch his observer contemporaneously. This feeling is obviously undesirable.84 The inquiry required by Katz, however, is
whether the social 'effects of surveillance are sufficiently undesirable
to invoke fourth amendment protection.85 This question may not
have a satisfactory answer, but the Supreme Court has evaded it altogether by invoking such devices as standing86 and assumption of risk.
The Court has reasoned that a citizen leaving a private place to
enter a public place relinquishes his expectation of privacy because
he has consciously chosen to encounter the risk of observation.87
This determination that an individual voluntarily chose to encounter the risk of observation differs substantially from a determination
that the fourth amendment guarantees no right to anonymity in public. A court must infer the individual's decision to encounter observation from the ·factual circumstances in each case, whereas the
conclusion that no right to anonymity exists is a legal, not factual,
conclusion. The Court's assumption of risk reasoning thus fails to
address the real issue.as
80. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 204;
Christie, supra note 17, at 887.
81. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 81.
·
82. Id at 81-82.
83. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 31.
84. "Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places
destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open spaces and public
arenas." Id Under the individual perspective the psychological effects of the fear of
surveillance can exist independent of actual surveillance. ''The fear of governmental
voyeurism is thought to be almost as destructive of personality as would be a physical
intrusion." Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 559.
85. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 83. The author obs!'!rves:
It is risky business to speculate how human beings will adapt to a changed
environment. Without being very precise, experience suggests that if we were
to lose the cloak of anonymity in public places, we should be less open, more
crafty, mor-e secretive, and more isolated than we are now. There is no way to
establish that our behavior now is better (more "natural," or more "human,"
or more pleasant) than it would be if we expected and had less privacy. In the
end we must rely on an unproved vision of man in society.
86. See note 13, supra
87. See, e.g., Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir.) (right of privacy does not
extend to commission of an act of sodomy in a car parked on a public highway), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1974)
(right of privacy may be surrendered on public disp,lay; it does not extend to "conduct
displayed under the street lamp on the front lawn').
88. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 406. One commentator has suggested that estoppel, rather than assumption of risk, is the appropriate doctrine when an individual's
conduct evidences an indifference to privacy. Stone, supra note 2, at 1217.
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The Court has also misconstrued the traditional doctrine of assumption of risk, which requires that the defendant voluntarily encounter89 a known and appreciated risk.90 Even if an individual
knows and appreciates the risk of surveillance whenever he goes out
in public, he has not voluntarily encountered the danger as required
by traditional assumption of risk principles. The voluntary choice
requirement of traditional assumption of risk analysis assumes the
presence of at least one alternative to the risk chosen.91 If the alternative to surveillance is reasonable and the defendant rejects it, he
has chosen voluntarily to be the subject of surveillance. If the individual has no reasonable alternative to surveillance, however, he has
not made a voluntary choice. Choice in the absence of reasonable alternatives is tantamount to duress.92 Thus, voluntariness of choice,
an essential element of assumption of risk, depends upon the reasonableness of the alternatives facing the individual at the time of his
choice.93 Thus, assumption of risk analysis is inappropriate in
resolving fourth amendment questions unless individuals have a reasonable alternative to appearing in public places.
The only citizens who have any alternative to appearing in public
places are those wealthy enough to live exclusively in private places.
All other citizens are incapable of assuming the risk of surveillance
89. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Winder, 340 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (after
knowledge and appreciation have been established "[t]here yet remains the issue as
to whether the [individual] voluntarily exposed himself to the danger known and appreciated by him."); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS§ 496E (1965).
90. City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 F. 321, 329 (8th Cir. 1909) ("Notice or knowledge and
appreciation of the danger are indispensable to the assumption of the risk."); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
91. See Note, Distinctions Between Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91, 99 (1966).
92. Smith v. United States, 153 F.2d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 1946) (''To constitute duress it
is sufficie!lt if ~e will b~, constrained by the unlawful presentation of a choice between
comparative evils . . • • ) •
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (2) (1965); see also Dougherty v. Chas.
H. Tompkins Co., 240 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (decision to use snowy temporary
sidewalk was not assumption of risk because no reasonable alternative was available);
Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions-Special Issue
Submission in Texa.s; 33 TEx. L. REV. 1, 14 (1954). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973): ''When, for example threats are used, the situation is one of choice
between alternatives, either one disagreeable, to be sure, but still subject to a choice.
As between the rack and a confession, the latter would usually be considered the less
disagreeable; but it is nonetheless a voluntary choice." Id at 224 n.7 (quoting 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) ). The traditional British view has
been that "a man cannot be said to be truly 'willing' unless he is in a position to choose
freely, and freedom of choice predicates • . . the absence from his mind of any feeling
of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will." Bowater v.
Rowley Regis Corp., [1944] 1 K.B. 476, 479.
For an interesting discussion of how the lack of reasonable alternatives affects substantive law, see Doss & Doss, supra note 38, noting that certain conduct can be proscribed as criminal because the individual has reasonable alternatives to engaging in
such conduct. For example, when public drunkenness is made a crime, "(a] man can
be drunk at home or in his club, and he can drink more moderately in other public
places .••." Id at 417 n.123. But laws proscribing the establishment or maintenance
of poly~amous households unduly limit the individual's ri~ht to be left alone because
the individual has no choice between reasonable alternatives. "A communal fainily
can either live together-or it can dissolve. There are no alternatives." Id
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because they have no alternative.94 The life of a total recluse, even if
economically feasible, may nevertheless be unreasonable.95 The loss
of freedom from even self-imposed seculsion to avoid surveillance96
may be too costly. If a completely private life is not a reasonable
alternative, the individual going out in public has not made a voluntary choice to assume the risk of surveillance. The assumption of
risk doctrine, properly applied, would not divest individuals of their
rights as quickly as the courts' present version of the doctrine. Properly applied, the assumption of risk doctrine would force the courts to
decide the social policy questions that they currently avoid when determining what constitutes a justifiable expectation of privacy. To
determine whether an _expectation of privacy is justifiable, the courts
must decide whether society will recognize some right to anonymity
in public places. Traditional assumption of risk analysis, however,
would require the courts to determine whether living exclusively in
private places is a reasonable (socially acceptable) alternative to appearing in public. Thus, if the assumption of risk doctrine were
properly applied the courts would gain little in their effort to avoid
ruling on social policy issues. The courts should abandon superficial
assumption of risk analysis when considering questions of privacy in
public places, and in fourth amendment cases generally. Assumption of risk only confuses the area and contributes nothing to an understanding of the fourth amendment.97

Inviting the Public into a Private Place
An individual cannot necessarily create an expectation of privacy by
locating himself beyond visual observation.98 The fourth amendment
94. Many poor people are forced to conduct their social lives on the street. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 104 (1967) (citing dilapidated and overcrowded
'housing, inadequate recreational facilities). Making the right to privacy turn on one's
standard of living may violate equal protection. Professor Weinreb suggests that tying
the right of privacy to private property may require that the government provide private ''places" to those who cannot afford them. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 84-85.
95. The privacy and life style of a Howard Hughes type may be unappealing even to
those who possess the requisite financial resources. Nevertheless, assets determine
one's potential for privacy. A typical middle-class individual may not be able to afford
to charter a private plane or seal off an entire floor of a hotel, but he can afford to join a
country club or use a union hall. The availability of such places to those with adequate financial resources leads to a basic feeling that we can retire to these places
when we want realprivacy. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 404.
96. Id at 402.
97. As used by the Court, assumption of risk "is not a reason but a conclusion. The
public assumes that risk because the law says it is a risk the public must assume."
Note, The Applicability of the ''New" Fourth Amendment to Investigatio7JS by Secret
Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy,
45 WASH. L. REV. 785, 809 (1970).
98. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), in which the Court held that
defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy when she was standing on the
threshold of the entrance to her home. Defendant had retreated into her house when
the police arrived and attempted to arrest her. The police made the arrest inside the
house "in hot pursuit" of defendant. The Court reasoned:
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of
one's dwelling is ''private," as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that unaer the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment I the defendant] was in a ''public" place. She was not in an area where she :had any
expectation of privacy . . • • She was not merely visible to the puolic but was
exposed to puolic view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing
completely outside her house.
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does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office.99 A person relinquishes all expectations of
privacy in an otherwise private place by knowingly and voluntarily
inviting all comers to enter or view that place.10° Courts disagree
whether this relinquishment rests on consent or on waiver. 101 Consent and waiver both emphasize the individual's state of mind, but
differ in other important respects.1°2 Courts determine the existence of both largely by the individual's state of mind and the presence of fraud or deception.103
Analysis under both the waiver and consent theories proceeds
from the premise that the defendant voluntarily relinquished a preexisting right to privacy. Both theories assume that the individual
has complete control over his right to privacy and that the government can justify intrusion only by establishing the individual's consent to the intrusion. Katz, however, rendered questions of consent,
waiver, and individual control unnecessary to a resolution of the privacy issue. Katz eliminated the necessity for the government to
show a waiver of privacy by the defendant by requiring the individual
to demonstrate that his claim to privacy is socially justifiable.
Courts must bestow fourth amendment protection by determining
which expectations of privacy are justifiable and desirable in society.
They have evaded this determination by substituting conclusions
about assumption of risk.104 Thus courts announce that unless the
individual takes actions such as drawing his curtains,1°5 building a
fence, 106 and boarding up a garage,107 he has assumed the risk of observation.108 By applying assumption of risk analysis to the hypothetical lovers, a court could conclude that John did not really want
to be free from observation when he engaged in sexual activities with
Id at 42.
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
100. The fourth amendment does not restrict the conduct of government officials
who enter an area open to the public in order to conduct a visual inspection of the
premises. United States v. Williams, 328 F.2d 887 (2nd Cir.}, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850
(1964); Fisherv. United States, 205 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346U.S. 872 (1953).
101. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 223-35 (1973).
102. Waiver requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, id at 235-38, whereas consent requires only voluntary consent, id at 231-34. The burden of proof also differs
between the two theories. Id at 238 n.25.
103. See notes 124-26 infra
104. See notes 87-97 supra and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g, People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 453 P.2d 721, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 914 (1971).
106. See, e.g, Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969}; People v. Wright, 41 Ill.
2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968). Presence of a fence is relevant to whether the area is an
"open field" or part of the protected "curtilage,'' Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
107. See, e.g, United States v. Wright, 449F.2d1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 947 (1972).
108. See, e.g, Gil v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) ("IW]here one
is so foolish as to leave his windows unsecured he may not complam if another observes an illegal act being committed therein.").
1 nnn1

Mary because he left the cottage shutters open. If John assures the
court that he actually did desire privacy, the court could conveniently
announce that John assumed the risk of observation.
The traditional assumption of risk requirements, however, are not
met in this hypothetical situation.109 The doctrine assumes a known
and appreciated danger, but John probably failed to consider the possibility that a federal agent with infrared binoculars110 would look
through the cabin window from a nearby mountain top. The court
should also consider John's alternatives to risking visual observation.
The superficial answer, that John has the reasonable alternative of
closing his shutters whenever he desires privacy, 111 is unacceptable
for several reasons. This approach implies that privacy is only
needed or desired for brief periods or specific activities. John can
obtain permanent privacy only by shuttering his windows at all
times. The resulting loss of sunshine, fresh air, and mountain view is
an unreasonable alternative to government surveillance. Even if
John does cover the windows, however, the privacy gained is illusory
because the government may continue to observe through cracks or
openings in the covering.112 To guarantee one's privacy under this
superficial approach requires an individual to block visual observation totally from both anticipated and unanticipated113 sources.
Courts cannot reasonably tell citizens that they must take whatever
steps are necessary to insure that absolutely no light or sound escapes from their premises because failure to do so subjects any emissions to government seizure. An individual today can presumably
protect himself against surveillance only "by retiring to the cellar,
cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, ·turning off the lights
and remaining absoulutely quiet."114 This action satisfies traditional
109. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
110. Some courts have been tempted to regard the use of technological devices as
determinative of whether a search has occurred. See generally Belair & Bock, supra
note 77; Dutile, supra note 34. The ''technological device" approach has not received
much support in situations involving visual surveillance, probably because the arsenal
of visual surveillance devices (e.g., flashlights and binoculars) cannot match the sophistication and variety of equipment used for auditory surveillance. See Dorsey v.
United States, 372 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We do not think the need to employ a
visual aid at night in the form of a flashlight converts this from lawful into unlawful
conduct.").
Focusing on technological devices appears to be a return to the means-oriented ap:proach of Olmstead and a departure from Katz, which places more emphasis on the
mterest to be protected than on the means of violating it. On the other hand, the
introduction of technological devices can so alter conditions in society as to drastically
affect reasonable or justifiable expectations of privacy. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at
82-83.
111. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A2d 904 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971). "It was incumbent on the suspect to preserve his
privacr from visual observation. To do that the appellees had only to curtain the windows.' 216 Pa. Super. Ct. at 181-82, 263 A2d at 907.
112. See, e.g, State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A2d 761, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1962).
"Peering through a window or a crack in a door or a keyhole is not, in the abstract,
genteel behavior, but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all conduct unworthy of a good neighbor." 37 N.J. at 496, 181 A2d at 769.
113. The city council of Bell Gardens, California, recently sought federal funding for
a two-y-ear, two-blimp project entitled "Demonstration of a Remotely Piloted Miniblimp System for Law Enforcement Surveillance in an Urban Area." The blimps
would measure 45 feet in length and 11 feet in diameter and would be armed with a
searchlight, public-address system, and zoom lens camera. Richmond News-Leader,
March 31, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
114. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 402. Cf.: "I do not want my house to be walled in
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assumption of the risk requirements only if courts regard this seclusion as a reasonable alternative in a free society. If courts do not
characterize seclusion as reasonable, they must abandon the fiction
that the individual relinquishes his privacy voluntarily. This would
necessitate determination of what expectations of privacy are justifiable and desirable in a free society.

Third-party Consent Situations
The law of consent is relatively clear when the police actually confront the person whose premises, property, or person is the subject of
the search. The government generally concedes or the court assumes that th~ individual had a justifiable expectation of pr:i,vacy.115
The controversy then centers on whether the individual relinquished
this expectation and gave permission for the search. In Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 116 the Supreme Court stated that relinquishment of
fourth amendment rights does not require a knowing and intelligent
waiver, but merely voluntary consent, to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.117 The Schneckloth consent
test places the courts on familiar ground in determining voluntariness.118 Unfortunately, clarity disappears in third-party consent situations when the police do not directly confront the individual whose
premises, property, or person is searched. By invoking assumption
of risk rhetoric, courls have blurred the distinction between the absence of a justifiable expectation of privacy and the voluntary relinquishment of an acknowledged expectation of privacy. If, in the
hypothetical situation, the police had asked John for permission to
search, the courts would simply consider the voluntariness of John's
consent. But the police confronted John's business partner, a
coowner sharing full use of the premises. If John's partner has voluntarily consented to the search, the court must determine whether
he had authority to consent to a violation of John's privacy. Underlying the determination of the third party's authority is a need to deteron all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown
about my house as freely as possible." M. Gandhi, quoted in W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE
MAN WITHOUT FORCE 20-21 (1963).
115. Of course, if no justifiable expectation of privacy existed, the court need not

ANATOMY OF LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF

consider the question of consent because no intrusion on privacy has occurred to
which the target must consent. The prosecution and the courts, however, are more
accustomed to dealing with consent than with justifiable expectations of privacy.
Thus, courts will frequently assume arguendothat the target had a justifiable expectation of privacy and then inquire whether the target voluntarily relinquished the expectation.
116. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
117. Id at 227.
118. The Court has a long history of determining the voluntariness of a confession,

in which the totality of circumstances includes such factors as lack of advice as to
constitutional rights, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); his lack of education, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); his low intelligence, Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957); the youth of the suspect, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600
(1948); and length of detention, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230-35, 239 (1940).
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mine the source of that authority, whether it is independent of or
contingent on John's intentions and actions.
Courts and commentators have suggested four theories to support
the third party's authority to consent to the search. The first theory
emphasizes apparent authority of the third party and good faith reliance by the police.119A second approach, the agency theory, suggests
that the third party stands in the shoes of the target individual and
may exercise all powers the target individual possesses.12°'l'he physical control theory holds that a third party in physical control of the
subject of a search has a certain amount of raw power over that subject and the target individual has a corresponding diminution of controi.121 The ''fact" of physical control empowers the third party to
consent to a search. Finally, under assumption of risk principles, the
third party has power to consent to a search because the target individual assumed the risk that the third party would consent.122
These four theories attach varying weights to the target individual's action and state of mind. Because the apparent authority concept evaluates the facts from the government's viewpoint, this article
defers analysis of apparent authority to the examination of the limitation perspective. At its logical extreme, apparent authority would
permit a burglar present on and in apparent control of the premises
to consent to a search if the police could not reasonably discover his
status as a burglar. The police face great practical difficulties in ascertaining the limits of apparent authority. 123 If the court views the
fourth amendment from the individual perspective, however, a policeman's ignorance of the third party's actual status would not eliminate the rights of the individual.
The target individual's state of mind is determinative under the
agency theory. If the third party has obtained all his authority directly from the target individual he is an agent of the target individual and agency law determines his actual authority. 124 The police
must demonstrate an explicit agreement by which the target individual confers power to consent on the third party before the police may
119. E.g, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974).
120. E.g, United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied sub nom.
Skally v. United States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
121. E.g, United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 5-7 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed at note
130 infra.
122. E.g, Frazierv. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
300-03 (1966).
123. Sympathy for the police officers must be kept in perspective by remembering
"that by resorting to consent, law enforcement officials are choosing to ignore a search
warrant. This decision not to resort to a warrant is the very thing the Supreme Court
is seekin~ to discourage•. A court should eschew encouraging officers to avoid warrants, which is the clear mandate of the amendment." Mascolo, Inter-Spousal Consent
to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: A Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351,
363-64 (1966). See also Weinreb, supra note 2 at 64:
The only sensible guide for the police is that they should never rely on consent
as the basis for a search unless they must. If they do search relying on consent, they should be prepared to meet a heavy burden of proof that consent
was in fact meaningfully given. And even then, because of the difficulties of
proof, they should expect to be told often that the search was not proper.
124. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (fourth amendment rights may be
waived "by word or deed, either directly or through an agent"). If the third party has
his own interest in the subject of a search and seizure, then of course he may decide
how to exercise or waive his rights. See note 140 infra.
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justifiably rely on the third party's consent.125 Explicit delegations of
authority are infrequent, and the agency theory rarely justifies an officer's reliance on the consent of third parties.126 Courts invoking
agency concepts therefore rely partially on apparent authority, physical control, or assumption of risk.121
Although the state of mind of the target individual determines the
effectiveness of third-party consent under the agency theory, it is irrelevant to the physical control theory. Authority to consent under
the physical control theory turns on the factual question of physical
control. Raw power overrides the subjective aspects of consent.
When a person sUITenders control of a place or object, therefore, he
loses the power to prevent government search and seizure of the
place or object, regardless of the terms of SUITender.128 The Court
has viewed subjective desires to retain control over an item beyond
physical control as "metaphysical subtleties," irrelevant to consent.129 At its logical extreme, the physical control theory produces
results more startling than the concept of apparent authority. A burglar in physical control of the target individual's premises would not
have to hide his status from the police. Although recognizing him as
a burglar, the police could nevertheless argue that the burglar's physical control over the premises gave him actual power to consent to a
search. Courts have failed to clarify whether physical control alone
is sufficient to allow consent to a search.1ao
125. See, e.g. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. at 490 (the expectation of privacy is relinquished when left to the "unfettered discretion" of others).
126. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 63: "People living agreeably together usually do not
anive at explicit, regular practices; they proceed by understandings that are most satisfactory if they are imprecise, flexible, and unstated."
127. See generally Weinreb, supra note 2.
128. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976):
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
129. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
130. See, e.g. United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976). In Sherwin, the
court applied the individual capacity silver platter doctrine, see Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921), and held that a search conducted by a private citizen is not within
the coverage of the fourth amendment. 539 F.2d at 6-7. Regarding defendant's contention that a government seizure (not search) occurred when the government accepted
control of the items from the private citizen, the court held that no seizure occurred
because the private searcher voluntarily relinquished the objects. The owner-defendant's consent, subjective intent, and expectation of privacy were all irrelevant.
[O]nly the fact of consent [by the third party] is relevant, not whether it was
properly authorized [by the owner] .••.
• • . The [third party's] legal authority to approve a transfer of objects
found in a private search has no bearing on whether his relinquishment of
those objects to the government is coerced or voluntary.
Id at 7. The court's statement is puzzling because its converse is also true-the private person's voluntary relinquishment of objects found in a private search has no
bearing on whether he has legal authority to transfer another's property to the government. "A person's consent . . . is relevant only to the extent that he has a protected
interest." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 54.
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Thus, the agency and physical control theories are antithetical.
Agency focuses wholly on the target individual's subjective intent,
whereas physical control excludes consideration of subjective intent
and focuses wholly on the third party's actual power. 131 Although
courts have embraced neither theory in its pure form, both concepts,
especially physical control, are important to the assumption of risk
theory, the current approach. Assumption of risk analysis reasons
that one sharing possession, use, or control of property with a third
party assumes the risk that the third party will consent to a search of
the property.132
Difficulties with the assumption of risk theory include defining
"possession," "use," and "control." These terms are ambiguous even
in their property law context,133 and the courts' efforts to free the
fourth amendment from its property law origins have made these
terms especially intractable.134 Even if the definitional problems
were resolved, the connection between conferring possession, use, or
control on a third party and conferring authority to consent to a
search is unclear. A babysitter in exclusive control of the owner's
premises may lawfully consent to a search of those premises,135 but
courts have failed to elucidate a burglar's inability to consent, even
though he possesses the same physical control. The distinction does
not depend on the owner's state of mind regarding a search, because
both the babysitter and burglar may lack explicit authorization to
consent to a search of the premises. When an owner permits a third
The Sherwin court apparently reasoned that once the third party, legally or illegally,
gains control over the items, the owner's privacy interest is eliminated and only the
property interests of the owner are implicated. 539 F.2d at 8 n.10. The court further
reasoned that because the fourth amendment protects privacy and not property ri~hts,
the government's action did not intrude on a fourth amendment interest. Id. An individual loses his justifiable expectation of privacy whenever he loses actual control, and
the loss of control in Sherwin was due to the conduct of a private citizen, not the government. What happens after the individual loses his justifiable expectation of privacy is irrelevant to the fourth amendment.
Although the holding in Sherwin is limited to the seizure issue, the analysis is
equally applicable to determine whether a search has taken place. If a private person
can eliminate another's justifiable expectation of privacy by taking control, a burglar
can do so when he takes control of the victim's house. Only the owner's property
interest in the dwelling remains when he has lost actual control, and under Sherwin's
reasoning, if the burglar voluntarily consents to a search of the house the government
has not intruded on the owner's privacy interests. Judicial acceptance of the physical
control analysis used in Sherwin would eliminate the fourth amendment as a protection of privacy in third-party consent situations and leave the protection of privacy
totally to the resources and ingenuity of the individual. Even though the individual
expects privacy and takes reasonable steps to protect his privacy, if someone succeeds
in breaching his defenses and gaining actual control, the individual thereby loses his
expectation of privacy and the protections of the fourth amendment. See notes 112-14
supra and accompanying text.
131. Consent ''is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state
of mind and an 'external' performance; consent is unequivocal and unquestioned only
when it includes both." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 55.
132. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
133. See, e.g, National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) ("[T]here is
no word more ambiguous in its meaning than Possession."). When the fourth amendment s:p,eaks of "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and
effects, ' does the word their ''refer to 'ownership' or 'possession' or 'custody' as these
are known to the local civil law or to something totally different?" Dutile, supra note
34, at 2.
134. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text.
135. See People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 479-80, 313 P.2d 206, 211 (1957) (babysitter deemed to have been authorized to permit a search because she had been left
the keys to her employer's apartment).
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party to be present on the premises, the owner knows that he has
partially relinquished his exclusive control over the premises to the
third party by virtue of the third party's physical presence. This
knowing surrender of control distinguishes the babysitter from the
burglar. Unlike the theory of physical control, assumption of risk
principles do not apply when the owner involuntarily loses control to
third parties. Courts invoke the assumption of risk doctrine only
when the owner has knowlingly surrendered some degree of physical
control. Courts employing the knowing surrender of physical control
analysis should also determine if this analysis satisfies traditional assumption of risk criteria and if the extent of control surrendered affects the third party's legal ability to consent to search.
The traditional assumption of risk doctrine requires that the homeowner voluntarily encounter a known and appreciated danger. 136 To
ascertain that the danger was known and appreciated, courts would
have to decide whether the homeowner realized that the babysitter
might admit the police to conduct an unauthorized search, and
whether the homeowner realized that the babysitter, the known and
accepted risk, was more likely to consent to the search than the burglar, the risk encountered by leaving the house empty. Although the
traditional assumption of risk doctrine requires courts to confront
these questions, ascertaining the answers is no small matter.
Neither the homeowner nor the court can accurately compare the
likelihood that a babysitter will consent to a search of the home with
the likelihood that a burglar will break into the house and then consent tci a search.137 Thus the requirement that the risk be known and
appreciated is virtually insurmountable.
To ascertain if the homeowner has actually made a voluntary
choice between reasonable alternatives, courts should inquire into
the homeowner's alternatives to leaving his home unoccupied or to
hiring a babysitter to care for his small children. If no reasonable
alternatives exist, no assumption of the risk has occurred. Courts
have, unfortunately, failed to confront these questions in third-party
consent situations, just as they have failed to confront them when
attempting to distinguish what is private from what is public.138 The
Supreme Court continues to announce conclusions expressed in superficial assumption of risk terminology without attempting reasoned analysis.
Even if traditional requirements of assumption of risk are met, applying assumption of risk to third-party consent problems is especially tenuous. An interpretation of the assumption of risk doctrine
broad enough to eliminate all expectations of privacy would emascu136. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
137. $ee Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 406-07.
138. See notes 94-97, 109-14 supra and accompanying text.
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late the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches because the target will always have acquiesced in the intrusion.139 The nature of the third party's conduct would therefore become irrelevant. If an owner relinquishes his expectation of privacy
in his premises whenever he hires a babysitter, the fourth amendment requires no additional relinquishment of the owner's rights140
by the babysitter. Regardless of the third party's consent or lack of
consent,141 the police are merely entering an area in which the owner
had no expectation of privacy.
If the effect of assuming the risk is viewed narrowly, however, an
individual voluntarily relinquishing his justifiable expectation of privacy to designated persons may nevertheless retain his privacy
against all others.142 Recognition of limited assumption of risk or
qualified expectation of privacy does not give the third party authority to set aside the target individual's remaining expectation of privacy.143 If the target individual retains his justifiable expectation of
privacy against everyone except the third party he has knowingly selected, the search threatens this remaining expectation of privacy.
The government should therefore obtain the consent of the target
rather than that of any third party.144 Courts, however, have rejected
this theory of a selective expectation of privacy.145 In the secret agent
139. Note, supra note 97, at 804 n.112: "[T]he consent question here relates to the
issue whether the fourth amendment applies in the first place. In other words did the
person knowingly expose information to the public."
140. Of course, the babysitter by virtue of her presence has her own right of privacy
in the premises and her action is required to relinquish her rights. The owner has a
certain expectation of privacy by virtue of being the owner, and the third party has a
certain expectation of privacy by virtue of being present. Certainly each can relinquish his own expectation of privacy, but what authorizes the third party to relinquish
the owner's expectation of privacy? Professor Weinreb has suggested that each party
with an interest has the independent power to deal with that interest and neither pcu;ty
can limit the interest of the other. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 61. If two owners fully
control access to the premises, each owner may admit anyone. In so doing, one owner
is not waiving the rights of the other owner, but is merely exercising his own right to
do as he pleases with his property.
This analysis raises two questions. First, does it apply to situations where the third
party, a babysitter, for example, is not a coowner but derives his interests from the
owner? Presumably, the owner has the right to limit the interest surrendered to such
a third party. 79 HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1515 (1966). Second, even in situations where two
parties have independent interests in the place to be searched or the item to be seized,
is the third party truly interested in the sense that the searcher and the target individual are? In the vast majority of cases the third party has no desire to exercise his
independent interest, because he is disinterested and his consent is "a passive acquiescence at best." Id at 1515 n.7. See also Mascolo, supra note 123, at 369-77.
141. If the target individual has relinquished his expectation of privacy, he has no
standing to contest the constitutionality of a search that may have violated another's
fourth amendment rights. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
142. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488·89 (1964).
143. Because the courts have held that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal
rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted," id., they should also hold that such
rights may not be vicariously waived. See Alderman v. United States, 494 U.S. 165, 179
& n.11 (1964).
144. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964): "It is important to bear in mind that
it was the petitioner's constitutional ri~ht which was at stake here, and not the [third
party's]. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or
deed, either directly or through an agent."
145. The courts have tended to recognize limited assumption of risk (or qualified
expectation of privacy) only if the limitation is expressed in terms of physical areas.
Thus, the owner may tell his_ babysitter, "You may enter the television room, the kitchen, and the children's bedroom, but you may not enter the master bedroom." If the
babysitter violates these instructions and enters the master bedroom, she becomes a
trespasser and cannot authorize a search of the forbidden area. See State v. Evans, 45
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and informer cases, for example, courts construe relinquishment of
privacy to one individual as a general release of the expectation of
privacy.
Secret Agents and Informers
The secret agent and informer problem includes undercover policemen such as Mary in the hypothetical situation previously developed.
This probelm also includes government agents who purchase narcotics, infiltrate political or social organizations, report or record conversations with friends and associates, or disguise themselves to gain
access to homes or businesses.146
The Supreme Court has generally declined to impose fourth
amendment requirements on secret agents and informers.147 The
only meaningful restraints originated in the pre-Katz cases that took
a property-oriented approach148 to privacy. Thus, when a governHawaii 622, 631-34, 372 P.2d 365, 371-73 (1962). But if the owner expresses his qualified
expectation of privacy in terms of purposes, not places, the courts are less willing to
recognize a qualified right of privacy. Thus, although the owner may instruct his babysitter, "You may enter all rooms of the house for purposes related to babysitting, but
you may not allow the police to enter for the purpose of searching,'' if the babysitter
violates these instructions and admits the police, her consent is deemed valid and the
search is not a violation of the owner's right to privacy. See United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976). But c[. Stoner v. Califorrua, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel em,;>loyee's
consent to search of guest s room held invalid where police had no basis to believe the
employee was authorized to permit the search). The courts have not distinguished
these two situations. The owner's subjective intent in both situations is the same; in
neither case does he intend to authorize the third party to consent to a search. Nor
does a distinction arise in terms of physical control. If the ''forbidden bedroom" is not
actually locked, then as a practical matter the third party has access to all parts of the
house. The courts have not explained why one must assume the risk that a third party
will violate an agreement not to authorize a search, but does not assume the risk that a
third party will violate an agreement not to enter a restricted physical area. Again,
assumption of risk is merely a conclusion and not a reason.
146. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203
(1975); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Stone, supranote 2; Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcemen~ 41
U. COLO. L. REV. 261 (1969).
147. See, e.g. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 208 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300 (1966); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952).
The Court has, however, placed fifth and sixth amendment restrictions on the use of
secret agents and informers. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Chief Justice Warren noted: ''This Court has not yet established the limits within which the
police may use an informer to appeal to friendship and camaraderie-in-crime to induce
admissions from a suspect, but suffice it to say here, the issue is substantial" Id at
444 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See generally Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in
Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968).
The use of informers can also be regulated under due process or the courts' supervisory powers, see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) ("affront to the quality
and fairness of federal law"). But see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967)
(" IW] e accept the premise that the informer is a vital part of society's defensive arsenal.")( quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 385, 201A.2d39, 49-50 (1964)); H. UVILLER,
Tm: PROCESSES OF CRThfiNAL JUSTICE: !NvES'F!GA'l'ION 439 (1974) ("the criminal insider.
secretly cooperating with the police or turning subsequently aNainst his criminal associates, performs an indispensable service t0--law enforcement').
148. In the area of secret agents, the Supreme Court has taken "an extremely nar-

ment agent uses misrepresentation, impersonation, or subterfuge to
gain admittance to the premises,149 courts have generally held that
the government activity constitutes a search within the prohibitions
of the fourth amendment. 15 Courts are familiar with questions of
physical trespass and the seizure of tangibles because of the fourth
amendment's development from property law. 151 The more complex
issue, seizure of intangible property such as conversations, requires
courts again to struggle with the justifiable expectation of privacy
problem. 152 The Court has unanimously and consistently held that
the use of secret agents to deceive individuals into revealing information in conversation, absent electronic recording or transmitting devises, is beyond the scope of the amendment.153
The critical question for the Court is whether the use of an electronic eavesdropping device subjects this kind of governmental conduct to the coverage of the fourth amendment. The Court addressed
the question in United States v. White, 154 and held that use of electronic surveillance devices by agents in direct conversation with the
target does not violate the fourth amendment. 155 The Court proceeded from the unchallenged premise that speakers must assume
the risk of informers and secret agents without electronic devices,156

°

row view of what constituted an invasion of privacy. The privacy analysis which resulted is little different from the property analysis ..••" Note, supra note 97, at 798.
149. "In attempting to gain entry to individuals' homes and offices ••• government
agents have posed as refrigerator salesmen, Western Union employees, air conditioning mechanics, representatives of the County Assessor's Office, carpet salesmen,
friends of purported mutual friends, and so on." Stone, supra note 2, at 1258-59 (citations omitted).
150. E.g. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921); Fraternal Order of Eagles
v. United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. General Pharmacal Co.,
205 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1962); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D.
Mass. 1954); United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225, 226 (M.D. Pa. 1933); People v.
Mesaris, 14 Cal. App. 3d 71, 75, 91 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (1970).
151. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
152. Miller, Computer v. Personal Dignity, 7 TRIAL 26 (March/AP.ril 1971).
"From
the constitutional point of view privacy under the Fourth and Fifth amendments is
likely to remain a nght to be free of unrestrained p~g, pee:ping and snooping. It will
be a long time before constitutional law concerns commurucation of thoughts, sentiments and emotions.'" Id. at 27 (paraphrasing Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) ).
153. E.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971), discussed at notes 154-58
infra.
154. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
155. Id. at 753. The Court split five to four on the question. Justice Black concurred in the judgment, based on the view expressed in his dissent in Katz, that nontrespassory electronic surveillance does not constitute a search and seizure under the
fourth amendment, id. at 754 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concurred in
the result, finding that "current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" interposes a warrant requirement on both third party electronic monitoring and electronic recording by
a government agent in face-to-face conversation with the target, id. at 755 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
156. "[H] owever strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Ainendment when it turns out
that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities.'' Id. at 749.
Cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), in which Justice
Douglas applied the limitation perspective:
(A) person may fake the risk that a friend will turn on him and report to the
police. But that is far different from the Government's ''planting" a friend in
a person's entourage so that he can secure incriminating evidence. In the one
case, the Government has merely been the willing recipient of information
supplied by a fickle friend. In the other, the Government has actively encouraged and participated in a breach of privacy by sending in an undercover
agent.
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and reasoned that the risk assumed did not increase materially siinply because the same informers were transmitting the conversation
electronically.157 Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that allowing
third-party bugging would inhibit spontaneity in personal conversations.158
The Court's approach to electronic surveillance is commendable insofar as it explicitly attempts to determine proper expectations and
risks in a free society, as mandated by Katz. Unfortunately, the
Court has not exhibited the same candor when considering the use of
secret agents without electronic devices. Instead of balancing the individual's sense of security against the utility of the surveillance to
law enforcement,159 the Court announces that the risk of betray8.l. by
one's friends and confidants is "inherent in the conditions of human
society" and that "it is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."160
Expectations concerning the loyalty of private parties differ from
the expectation that a supposedly private party is in fact a government agent. 161 Betrayals by private parties are not within the fourth
amendment, 162 but the fourth amendment does regulate government
action through its agents. Citizens would react quite differently to
reports that their personal confidants are fickle or gossips than to reports that the government has released upon society "sprawling,
mass-producing, self-perpetuating systems of spies and informers
...."163 A citizen willing to risk his privacy in one situation may
not be willing to risk it in the other situation. The Court makes no
distinction, indicating that individuals can merely choose their listeners more carefully.164 This approach enables the Court to neglect
the cumulative iinpact of an army of government spies on society,
because each individual may avoid the risk or assume the risk.165
Id at 347 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. 401 U.S. at 752.
158. Id at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an attempt to apply empirical evidence in a similar context, see Brief for Plaintiff, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972),
reprinted in Askin, Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective, 4 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L REV. 59, 62-88 (1972).
159. This is the test su~ested by Justice Harlan in United States v. White, 401 U.S.
at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
161. Kitch, supra note 36, at 150.
162. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). However, instances may
arise in which ''there can be a kind of after-the-fact ratification" of the private conduct
by government officials sufficient to bring the amendment into play. White, The Fourth
Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study ofRobinson and Matlock, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 165, 221 n.107.
163. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 401; see Stone, supra note 2, at 1236: "[T] here are
virtually no hard empirical data concerning the use of secret agents, spies, and informers. Nevertheless, the best available estimates indicate that the practice is employed
at least tens, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands of times annually, and its use is
apparently steadily increasing."
164. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
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Characteristically, the Court's use of assumption of risk principles
in the secret agent cases is superficial, failing to consider the availability of reasonable alternatives. One obvious alternative is "to keep
one's mouth shut on all occasions."166 By applying the fourth
amendment to telephone wiretaps, 167 however, the Court has implicitly recognized that total silence is not a reasonable alternative.168
The Court has failed to explain why an individual must assume the
risk that the listener is a government agent but need not assume the
risk that the government is tapping his telephone.
Another alternative to speaking to government agents, often invoked by the Court, is for the speaker simply to exercise caution in
choosing his audience. 169 The Court has reasoned that if a speaker
doubts the trustworthiness of his listener, confidential communication ''will very probably end or never materialize."170 This reasoning
ignores those situations in which an individual must speak,171and
overestimates the average citizen's ability to recognize a secret
agent. 172 If the individual has the ability to forego speech or to identify government spies, he does have an alternative to surveillance;
but the reasonableness of the alternative remains questionable, and
the Court has failed to assess its social costs. Justice Harlan was
correctly concerned that widespread electronic surveillance by the
government "might "?'ell smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discours'e-that liberates
daily life." 173

Summary of the Individual Perspective
The individual perspective requires courts to identify the interests
protected by the fourth amendment. The "means-oriented" approach of Olmstead allowed courts to specify these interests in terms
of freedom from physical intrusion. Although the Olmstead approach resulted in unsatisfactorily intricate factual determina166. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The individual is forced to choose between silence and speaking to the entire world, because the
Court has not recognized the concept of limited consent: "consent to reveal information to a particular person or agency, for a particular purpose, is not consent for that
information to be circulated to all or used for other purposes." A. WESTIN, supra note
42, at 375.
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-53; see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 5455 (1967).
168. ''The only difference is that under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk
to anybody in your office or over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to
talk to anybody at all." Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 407; cf Greenawalt, supra note
147, at 219: "In general, however, it seems doubtful that the nsk of participant monitoring is one that would have any direct effect on communications to friends."
169. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
170. U~ted States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
171. Greenawalt, supra note 147, at 220.
.
172. The average citizen may be dealing with a "skilled professional dissembler,
able to manufacture the usual mdicia of reliability."
White, supra note 162, at 229.
The individual who is confronted with the possibility that his s.upposed friends
and associates are in reality secret agents of government must attempt to assess, not only their loyalty as l?ersons, but also the likelihood that they are
professional spies specially tramed in the art of deception, or that, at some
unknown level of inducement they would agree to "sell" that loyalty to the
authorities.
Stone, supra note 2, at 1241.
173. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tions,1 74 the standard itself was clear. When Katz cut the fourth
amendment free from the physical intrusion requirement, the Court
was cast adrift on a sea of uncertainty concerning the scope of the
amendment. The Court in Katz invoked a right to privacy without
defining it. The Court stated that not all forms of privacy are protected by the fourth amendment,175 but provided no meaningful guidance as to which claims of privacy are covered by the amendment.
Olmstead required precise measurements of physical intrusions.
The Court must now determine which expectations of privacy are desirable in our society. Some may consider this improper judicial legislation;l76 others consider it the highest of the judicial functions.1 77
Regardless of the view accepted, the Court's invocation of the assumption of risk doctrine is indefensible when used to avoid determining whether the individual has foregone reasonable alternatives
to encounter a known risk. Like obscenity,178 the Court apparently
knows assumption of risk when it sees it, but is unable or unwilling to
explain how individuals can involuntarily or unknowlingly assume
risks they do not desire to incur.
Identifying socially legitimate expectations of privacy would not,
however, fully delineate the contours of the fourth amendment. The
Court in Katz recognized that the interests protected by the fourth
amendment "often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 179 These
other interests are the limitation and regulation of government
power. A balanced view of the fourth amendment therefore requires
consideration of the limitation perspective.

The Limitation Perspective: A Theoretical Model
The individual perspective places an initial burden on the individual
to justify his expectation of privacy.180 The type and quantum of evi174. E.g. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
175. 389 U.S. at 350.
176. See id at 374 (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921):
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic,
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely
upon the comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be
thereby promoted or impaired. . . •
If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another,
I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it,
from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself.
Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and his.
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided
by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating
within the limits of his competence.
178. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
179. 389 U.S. at 350.
180. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
rn7Rl

dence required to meet this burden are unclear because the courts
avoid determining which expectations of privacy are justified.181 If
the target individual does establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the reasonableness of its intrusion. The government's burden to demonstrate
reasonableness, however, is similarly unclear.182 If the individual
fails to justify his expectation of privacy, use of the individual perspective renders even the "minimal requirement of reasonableness "183 of the governmental conduct irrelevant for fourth
amendment purposes. 184 The governmental conduct is immunized
from scrutiny even though it results from such illegitimate or even
malicious motives as governmental curiosity, a desire to gather and
report interesting information, or personal distaste for the political
philosophies or lifestyles of certain citizens.185 The courts thus
"leave the individual at the mercy of the police."186 Other possible
restrictions cm governmental action, such as the due process
clause,187 the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court, 188 the selfdiscipline of the executive branch, 189 and the enactments of the legislative branch190 are illusory. Current practice leaves decisions to in181. "[E]ffective articulation of the fourth amendment threshold in the language of
'privacy' assumes a willingness on the part of courts to deal openly on the plane of
human values." Note, Fonnalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.s; 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 991 (1977). To
date, the courts have been unwilling to make such value-laden detenninations. See
notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
182. The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" and
guarantees that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause," note 1 supra. In
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court split over the relationship
between these two clauses. The majonty stated that "rt l he relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id at 66. Justice Frankfurter disagreed, arguing that ''the framers said with
all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant
authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id at 70
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The result in a particular case, therefore, turns on the
relationship between the two clauses.
183. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
184. Marullo v. United States, 328 F .2d 361, rehearing denied, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1964): "Since we held that the location of the evidence in question was not \vithin the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of the search is not a relevant constitutional consideration." See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 335.
185. Hufstedler, su.pranote 40, at 552. The United States Army's surveillance of private citizens in the sixties was directed at ''people who were outspoken against the
[Vietnam] war, people who belonged to peace organizations, people who criticized the
President on matters either foreign or domestic. In short, it aimed at active citizens."
Mikva, Society's Threat: The Military Sleuth, 7 TRIAL 20, 20 (March/April 1971).
See
People v. Collier, 85 Misc. 2d 529, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1975).
186. Mascolo, supra note 17, at 418. The author also asserts that by classifying the
government activity as non-search and thereby exempt from the fourth amendment,
tlle courts "deny the protection [of the amendment] to those most in need of it-those
individuals who have not given the police probable cause to act." Id at 418-19. See
also Comment, supra note 32, at 698, noting that "search and seizure, particularly in
the absence of a warrant, come at an early stage in the law enforcement process. The
danger of confounding the innocent with the ~ty is greater here than in subsequent
stages, which may be reached only after a vanety of judicially controlled checks." See
alsoK. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 172.
187. See, e.g. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
188. See, e.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
189. See, e.g, Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1971) (testimony of W. H. Rehnquist).
190. "Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensitive
to the concern of protecting persons under investigation by the police." Amsterdam,
supra note 5, at 378-79.

556

(VOL.

46:529

Nature of the Fourth Amendment
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

vestigate, to place subjects under surveillance, or to do anything
short of search, in the hands of individual police officers, whose
power is unchecked. 191
A determination that a given form of police conduct does not constitute a search is therefore tantamount to exempting the conduct
from all legal control. Conduct subject to fourth. amendment requirements, on the other hand, must meet the standard of reasonableness. The limitation perspective frames the fourth amendment
coverage issue as a choice between requiring the police to act reasonably and permitting them to act without legal restraint. The limitation perspective concludes that all police activity should be subject to
the fourth amendment. In contrast to the individual perspective,
which is primarily concerned with intrusions upon individual rights,
the limitation perspective focuses on the unreasonable or irrational
exercise of governmental power. From the limitation perspective, an
individual need not establish his right and a violation of that right.
He must only demonstrate government action sufficient to constitute
a search in order to force the government to justify that action as
reasonable.192
·
Viewing unreasonable government action as an evil is as much a
value judgment as concluding that privacy is desirable and worthy of
fourth amendment protection. Although courts must define with
particularity the concept of unreasonable governmental action, the
basic value judgment that the government should act reasonably is
beyond question.193 The concept of limited government is a familiar
theme of fourth amendment jurisprudence,194
191. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 576 (1972). These decisions by individual police officers are beyond the control of the law because the :prime
instrument of controlling illegal searches and seizures-the exclusionlll'y rule-is not
involved when the fourth amendment is inapplicable. Improper police behavior is
thus "concentrated on investigative techniques not covered by the amendment."
Kitch, supra note 36, at 152.
192. In his study of Greek jurisprudence, Sir Paul Vinogradoff emphasized that "the
most usual means of keeping the magistrates in order was provided by the ri~ht of
every citizen to attack and arraign a magistrate who had actually broken the law,' even
though the citizen himself was not directly affected. 2 P. VmoGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF
HlsTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 114 (1922). This right of accusation was "one of the fundamental principles of the Athenian Constitution [and] ... it is apparent throughout
the whole Greek system that its importance was enormous." Id at 115. While application of the limitation perspective could lead to the elimination of all standing requirements, see, e.g~ People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-61, 290 P.2d 855, 856-57 (1955),
removin~ the initial burden of establishing a justifiable expectation of privacy does not
necessarily mean that the individual has no burden to establish some form of standing.
It would mean only that the burden would be different from the rather confused standing requirement. The present Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule has
caused it to take a very restrictive view of standin~ and the scope of the fourth amendment. See generallyKnox, supranote 13 (proposing a more traditional view of standing and scope of the fourth amendment); Hufstedler, supra note 40.
193. "The acceptance of police authority depends largely on the belief that its exercise is reasonable." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GoALS: POI.ICE 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as N.AC. POLICE].
194. Doss & Doss, supra note 38, at 396; Emerson, supra note 39, at 229: ''The concept
19781
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The power of the state has always been limited by practical constraints. Information-gathering technology is advancing so rapidly,
however, that future limitations on governmental power may be political rather than practical.195 These changes may signal a need to
emphasize the moral and philosophical basis for limited government, 196 and to return to ''the oldest theme which underlies the history of American constitutional law, that of Liberty Against
Government." 197
Although commentators have explained the moral and philosophical limitations on government as a recognition of the natural rights of
the individual,198 other mechanisms to limit governmental power are
present in constitutional law. The notion of checks and balances and
the concept of separation of powers are unrelated to individual rights
but also recognize the inherent danger of unchecked power.199 The
Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular are
restrictions on unfettered governmental power rather than reflections of natural law rights.200
Sensitivity to the dangers of unchecked power and totalitarianism
arose in the years immediately preceding the American Revolution,201 but the role it played in the drafting of the fourth amendment
is unclear. Good authority indicates, however, that the authors of
the Bill of Rights, who had known oppressive government, intended
to guarantee their successors maximum freedom from governmental
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen."
195. Robert Henderson, vice president and general manager of the electronic data
processing division of Honeywell, Inc., notes that computer technology is advancing so
rapidly that it may soon possess ''the eventual capability to store and constantly update in computer memory all the information available m the world." Henderson, A
False Fear, 7 TruAL 24, 24 (March/April 1971).
196. Beaney, supra note 30, at 214: " [ 0] ur constitution and our system of constitutional government reflect a decision that government is limited in the powers and in
the methods it may use." See generally Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 943 (1958).
197. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GoVERNMENT xiii (1948).
198. E.g. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional LaU\ 12 MicH. L.
REV. 247, 248 (1914): ''The written constitution is ..• but a nucleus or core of a much
wider region of private rights, which, though not reduced to black and white, are as
fully entitled to the protection of government as if defined in the minutest detail." In
arguing against the 1Ssuance of general warrants, James Otis asserted that their issuance was improper because "an act against natural equity is void," quoted in J.
LANDYSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY m CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 34 (1966).
199. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (constitutional checks and balances were devised "not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power"). See THE F'EDERAUST Nos. 48 and 51 (J. Madison); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 30 (6th ed. 1977).
200. See, e.g, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)
(''The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreview,ed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy."); Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 61
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the Bill of Ri~hts as ''the maximum restrictions u:pon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with
the mamtenance of organized society itself''); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
456 (1948) ("Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their
own cannot be trusted.").
201. In the famous Wilkes affair, the King's Bench invalidated general warrants issued to search for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable
paper. Chief Justice Pratt characterized nameless warrants as "a law under which no
Englishman would wish to live an hour." Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B.
1763).
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interference.202
Unchecked power to search and seize is crucial to the maintenance
of a totalitarian state. Totalitarian regimes typically proscribe "offenses" like sedition, unpopular thought, and disapproved literature,
which threaten the government's existence.203 Plenary search and
seizure power is essential to the detection of these crimes.204 Strict
controls on the government's power to search and seize inhibit the
enforcement of oppressive laws, and serve as a bulwark against totalitarian government.
In addition to limiting institutional tyranny, the foUrth amendment
limits the exercise of arbitrary power by individual government officials.205 The official who decides to investigate is most frequently a
policeman on the street rather than a high government official.206 To
place these decisions beyond fourth amendment control is, in the
words of James Otis, to place ''the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer."207 Security against arbitrary police intrusion
is a basic tenet of free society and lies at the heart of the fourth
amendment.208
Although recent decisions concerning border searches209 and airport searches210 confer broad discretion on officers in those specialized areas, the courts have traditionally recognized that failure to
impose a reasonableness standard on officials may permit capricious
or malicious conduct.211 Complete elimination of discretion and the
potential for arbitrariness, however, is both undersirable and impos202. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1969) (the fourth amendment's
''proscription of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' must be read in light of 'the history that gave rise to the words'-a history of 'abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as
to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution.' ") (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Weinreb, supra note 2, at 47:
''The fourth amendment is one of the Constitution's richly generative texts. Its important terms are general. • • • The amendment invites treatment as a broad statement
about the relationship between an individual and the government."
203. Comment, supra note 32, at 700.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (noting the
"grave danger that .•• unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in
the field"); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967).
206. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
URBAN POI.ICE F'uNCTION, Standard 4.1 (1973); K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975);
N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at Standard 1.3; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91-95 (1967).
207. James Otis, quoted in2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Wroth and H.
Zobel eds. 1965).
208. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
209. E.g, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
210. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). In
his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly stated that he would have "no difficulty in sustaining a search that was based on nothing more than the trained intuition of an airline
ticket agent or a marshal of the Anti-Hijacking Force," id at 675 (Friendly, J., concurring).

'

211. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty.").

1Q7Al

sible.212 It is undesirable because mechanical application of rules
frequently leads to injustice. It is impossible because rules always
lack sufficient detail to resolve ever:y problem.213 Officials can use
their discretion properly to further justice or improperly to frustrate
justice. The remedy for the potential abuse of discretion is to employ checks and balances to control the exercise of discretion and to
prevent arbitrar:y action.214

The Fourth A'fl?.endment as a Specific Limitation on Government
Power
The fourth amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and
seizures"215 rather than providing a basis for plenar:y control of all
governmental power. The requirement of a search has bedeviled the
Court in its use of the individual perspective to construe the fourth
amendment. The Court has defined the search concept in terms of
the individual's justifiable expectation of privacy.216 In contrast, the
limitation perspective emphasizes the conduct of the government
rather than the expectation of the individual.217 The fourth amendment therefore governs the exercise of governmental power regardless of the effect of the search on a particular indivic;iual.218 Thus, the
limitation perspective defines a search as that type of government
action that is controlled by the fourth amendment.
Before the right to privacy became an important fourth amendment concept, courts commonly defined a search as a quest for incriminating evidence. 219 The Court indicated that fourth
amendment safeguards should extend primarily to quests for evidence of crime and secondarily to intrusions on privacy.220 In
Camara v. Municipal Court,221 however, the Court rejected the traditional definition and applied fourth amendment standards to a nonevidentiar:y search for fire and health code violations.222 Camara is
212. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 17: "No government has ever been a government of
laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government has always been a government of laws and of men"
213. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 427, 428
(1960); Goodhart, supra note 196, at 949: "It is obvious that under no conceivable political system can there be complete rule under law, as a large dew-ee of freedom of action
must be left to those who exercise the power of government. '
214. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 216.
215. See note 1 supra.
216. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also Dworkin,
supra note 2, at 339.
218. For an apparent example of the limitation perspective expressed in the terminology of the sixth amendment, see Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
219. See, e.g, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 237 (1960); United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 380 {5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S.1135 (1974); United States v. Goldenstein, 456F.2d1006, 1009-10 (8th Cir.1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd CU".), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964); Haerr v.
United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957).
220. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank viewed the fourth amendment as
serving a dual purpose. First, the amendment protects citizens from unwarranted
governmental invasions of their privacy, id. at 365. Second, by prohibitin~ unreasonable searches and seizures, it prevents the government from compromising the fifth
amendment right against self incrimination, id.
221. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
222. Id at 530. Defining a search as limited to criminal investigations reduces the
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consistent with the individual perspective because the fourth amendment grants the same protection to a person accused of a crime as to
a person who is not. The individual perspective ignores the purpose
of the government intrusion by concentrating on the scope of the target individual's rights.
In contrast, the limitation perspective does consider the government's purpose. This perspective recognizes the factual differences
between a search for incriminating evidence and a routine inspection
for fire and health hazards.223 In Wyman v. James,2 24 for example,
the Court held that routine home visits by welfare workers were not
searches for purposes of the fourth amendment.225 The Court emphasized that the primary purpose of the visits was not investigative
even though welfare workers could uncover evidence of criminal
fraud,22 6 and refused to equate the visit with a fourth amendment
search.227 Wyman implies that governmental intrusion for purposes
other than criminal investigation is not a search and is therefore beyond the scope of the fourth amendment.
Unlike Camara, Wyman is incomprehesible from the individual
perspective, under which an invasion of privacy is not determined by
examining the invader's purpose.228 The limitation perspective, on
the other hand, allows the court to moderate the governn:ient's power
to investigate crime by using the fourth amendment and to moderate
the government's power to inspect for health, safety, or welfare by
using other controls. The Court's decision in Wyman therefore
seems to incorporate the limitation perspective.
Although Wyman's approach is defensible, its definition of a
search as a quest for incriminating evidence effectively removes administrative searches from the fourth amendment and is probably
too narrow even under the limitation perspective. The Court has
recognized, for example, that 'the framers of the Constitution were
concerned with forfeitures of property as well as criminal prosecutions.229 The concept of the "New Property"230 demonstrates the citifourth amendment to "little more than a rule of criminal procedure," Hufstedler, supra
note 40, at 557. Of course at present the chief means of "enforcing" the fourth amendment is by the exclusion of evidence in a criminal prosecution, and to that extent the
amendment has functioned primarily as a rule of criminal procedure.
223. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949)' (':P,ublic interest
required that personal privacy be invadable for the detection of crime').
224. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
225. Id. at 317. Alternatively, the Court held that if the visits were searches, they
were nonetheless reasonable under the fourth amendment, id. at 318.
226. Id. at 323.
227. Id.
228. See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
229. Frankv. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959): "[I)t was on the issue, of the right to
be secure from searches for evidence to be used in cnminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought."
230. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.733 (1964).
Under the New Property
concept,
[w] ealth is not 'owned', or 'vested' in the holders. Instead, it is held condition-

zen's dependence on the state in many novel ways, exposing the
citizen to subtle forms of government retaliation short of criminal
prosecution.231 The Court has recognized the link between government information-gathering, enhanced greatly by modern electronics
and computers,232 and the increased coercive power available to the
state.233 This information-gathering ability "gives the government
the raw materials of tyranny."234
Insofar as all knowledge acquired by the government enhances the
potential for coercion,235 courts should expand the definition of a
search to encompass any information-gathering activity by the
state.236 Absence of intent to misuse information is iITelevant to the
fact of misuse.237 Just as subjective intent is not determinative of an
individual's justifiable expectation of privacy,238 courts should likewise disregard the governmental agent's intent, benevolent or pernicious, in defining a search from the limitation perspective. If a
fourth amendment search includes any practice by which the government is likely to obtain information about an individual, surveillance
and the use of secret agents are within the scope of the fourth
amendment. This definition encompasses almost all police investigations because "investigation" connotes careful inquiry, research,
examination, and systematic tracking, all of which are characteristic
ally, the conditions being ones which seek to ensure the fulfillment of obligations imposed by the state. Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal
through a system of mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty, so government largess binds man to the state.
Id at 769-70.
231. See, e.g, Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D.D.C. 1966) (welfare
benefits are grants and gratuities and "[b)eing absolutely discretionary, there is no
judicial review of the manner in which that discretion is exercised.").
232. See note 195 supra.
233. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
234. Senator Charles Mathias, Jr. quoted in The Right of Privacy, 7 TRIAL 13, 13
(March/April 1971).
235. If courts could develop safeguards against governmental misuse of information,
safeguards against the mere acquisition of information could become unnecessary.
The problem with such an approach is that the misuse of information may be subtle or
secret and thus beyond the reach of effective safeguards. See, e.g, Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S.1 (1972) (claim that Army intelligence data gathering had a chilling effect on first
amendment ri~hts held not justiciable). The Supreme Court has on other occasions
rested a decision on the opportunities for abuse of official power. See, e.g, United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230-31, 236 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47
(1966); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). See also, Beaney, supra note
30, at 228 (object of fourth amendment is arguably to limit the possibilities of arbitrary,
overzealous, governmental action).
236. See Note, supra note 97, at 788. Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler, circuit judge for
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, defines a search as "any governmental
probe, corporeal or incorporeal, designed to uncover or to disclose information about a
person." Eufstedler, supra note 40, at 561. Although this definition is otherwise
sound from the limitation perspective, the term "designed" is too narrow if confined to
subjective intent to uncover or disclose information. It invites perjury, see generally
Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIM. L.
BUL. 3 (1969); Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L. J. 507 (1971), and "hedging" of the facts, seeAmsterdam, supranote
5, at 437 (motivation is a self-generating phenomenon); LaFave, supra note 4, at 154
(not difficult to convince one's self of nonexistence of "bad" motive for search). But
cf. Mascolo, supra note 17, at 416: ''The critical factor in any search is the mental
processes of the searcher. . . . [I) t can only lead to confusion if one attempts to divorce
the officer from his purpose."
237. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."). See generallyBacigal, supra note 13.
238. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751-52.
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of a paradigmatic search.239
The chief criticism of this definition of search is that it would apply
the full panoply of fourth amendment protection to every attempt by
the government to acquire information. This application would either paralyze the government or trivialize the warrant requirement
by the very frequency of its use.240 This criticism assumes that the
full complement of fourth amendment protection would apply to
every search. The Supreme Court, however, has shown great flexibility in determining what fourth amendment safeguards are required for various types of searches.241 The Court no longer relies on
the traditional monolithic view, which imposes all of the safeguards
or none of the safeguards. If the search -is less intrusive than ordinary searches, the Court requires less than probable cause.242 Conversely, a more intrusive search, such as extraction of a blood
sample, requires more than probable cause.243 The Court has also
held that strict compliance with all procedural rigors 244 of the fourth
amendment is unnecessary for some information-gathering practices.245
The flexibility of this sliding scale approach is appealing. It frees
the courts from strict formulations of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion,246 and permits them to react sensitively to the variety of
factual situations confronting police officers. Ironically, flexibility is
also the greatest potential drawback of this formulation. The Court
has failed to explain or define reasonableness.247 Without a standard,
239. People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc. 2d 561, 563, 270 N.Y.S.2d 732, 736 (1966). See a'tsoAmsterdam, supra note 5, at 396; Kitch, supra note 36, at 134.
240. Kitch, supra note 36, at 134; see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 547-48
(1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
241. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (operation of a fixed
checkpoint); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (search of impounded automobile); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (search during street encounter when
officer believes his safety or that of others to be in danger); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (routine inspection for housing and fire code violations); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (blood test).
242. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30 (pat-down search when officer reasonably believed
subject was armed and dangerous).
243. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
244. The procedural requirements of the fourth amendment are a showing of probable cause for a search, procurement of a search warrant, and specification of the location to be searched and the articles sought. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976).
245. E.g, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (regulatory inspection to
further urgent federal interest sustained if possibilities of abuse are not great); Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (detention for fingerprinting permissible on warrant issued for less than probable cause); Camara v. Muruci:pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967) (routine inspection warrant granted based on legislative or administrative
standards of reasonableness).
246. The reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), see
notes 241-42 supra, has been lowered in other cases. E.g, United States v. Lindsey, 451
F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); United States v. Marshall,
440 F.2d 195, 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909 (1970); Ballou v. Massachusetts,
403 F.2d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 909 (1969).
247. Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973):
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general stan-

the Court merely recites the factual situation and announces in conclusory fashion that the search was or was not reasonable.248 This
"show it to me and I'll tell you if it's reasonable" analysis denies police officers and citizens advance notice249 of the fourth amendment's
scope and thus reduces the amendment to a Rorschach blot. The
limitation perspective offers a mechanism for defining reasonableness within the fourth amendment.

Reasonableness Under the Limitation Perspective
The standard of reasonableness employed by the limitation perspective limits judicial review of searches and seizures by deferring to the
determination of reasonableness made by some other responsible
entity. A court's determination that the government's conduct meets
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment will not require detailed factual inquiry, unless the courts themselves have responsibility for controlling the governmental power to search.250
The court will simply determine whether the responsible entity observed proper procedure and had a rational basis for approving the
search. This form of limited judicial review is consistent with the
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powezz,251 which
held that in habeas corpus proceedings, federal courts should respect
determinations of fourth amendment issues by state courts.252
. The main purpose of the limitation perspective, controlling the arbitrary and oppressive use of state power against citizens,253 determines the appropriate mechanism to moderate the government's
search power. Courts select the mechanism by ascertaining the
component of citizenry to be searched, and classifying the components as the entire citizenry, the citizen as an individual, or the citizen as a member of a group or class. These three possible targets of
a search suggest three categories of searches and three distinct
mechanisms to review the reasonableness of each type of search.

dard of ''unreasonablenesi;" as a guide in determining whether searches and
seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant
is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ...
and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of the
Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases
such as this.
Id at 448 (citations omitted).
248. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text.
249. See Wright, supra note 191, at 588 (calling for recognition of "a due process right
to have one's conduct governed by rules which are stated in advance").
250. See notes 279-317 infra and accompanying text.
251. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
252. The Court recognized that the state court was a "fair and competent" entity for
adjudicating fourth amendment rights and refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Id
at 493 n.35. The limitation perspective suggests that administrative officials and the
general electorate can determine competently certain fourth amendment issues. The
scope of judicial review required by the limitation perspective is confined to whether
an appropriate entiw has fully and fairly determined tliat the search was reasonable.
253. The term "citizens" is used generically to include all members of society, and is
not meant to exclude aliens.
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Category I: Searches Applied Openly and Uniformly to All
Citizens
If the government exercises its power to acquire information openly
and equally against all citizens, the citizenry itself should determine
the reasonableness of the search. This conclusion assumes that a
body of law cannot endure unless it corresponds with existing social
mores, 254 and that no constitution, law, or court can preserve or revive liberties that are no longer highly valued.255 Indeed, the public
has the right to judge the reasonableness of government action and
the wisdom to exercise that power properly. 256 Nevertheless, critics
could suggest that the Category I procedure improperly submits constitutional questions to majority vote, 257 and thus disregards the importance of the Constitution as a guarantor of the rights of the
minority. The Bill of Rights insulates certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, and entrusts the enforcement of certain rights to the courts.258
The individual perspective considers the fourth amendment an expression of the individual's inalienable right to privacy, and places
the question of reasonableness of a search beyond the control of the
electorate.259 From the limitation perspective, however, protecting
individuals from the tyranny of the majority260 differs from protecting the majority from itself. The tyranny of the majority presents no
problem when the governmental action in question affects all citizens equally. Underlying the first amendment is the premise that
well-informed citizens can distinguish truth from falsehood.261
Courts should extend this confidence in the citizens by deeming citizens capable of determining the reasonableness of Category I
searches. This confidence in the people's ability to identify unreasonable actions by the government developed early in American history.262
254. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 64, at 41.
255. L. HAND, Tm: SPIRlT OF LIBERTY 190 (1952).
256. Placing our hope in the collective judgment of the ;t:ieople does not mean we
must abandon hope that we will see ''the high resolve of political officials, law-makers
and law-implementers, to take affirmative steps to protect and enlarge the liberties of
those they govern. Pollack, To Secure the Individual Rights of Many, in LAw IN A
CHANGING AMERICA 55 (G. Hazard ed.1968).
257. Of course the traditional conce:pt of properly limited judicial power restricts the
Court to deciding constitutional questions as a byproduct of traditional cases and controversies. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
258. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
259. J. s. Mill, On Liberty, in 25 HARVARD CLASSICS 219 (C.W. Elliot ed. 1909): "If all
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrazx
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."
260. See text accompanying notes 279-317 infra.
261. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
262. In the Virginia debates on the Federal Constitution, Patrick Henry rhetorically
queried: "When these harpies (federal sheriffs) are aided b;y exisemen, who ma~
search, at any time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will the people bear it? '

Even under the prevailing individual perspective, public evaluation
of government action influences the judicial determination of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. Although purporting to follow ''the rule of law"263 rather than public pressure, courts remain
sensitive to those pressures264 and have admitted that the "degree of
community resentment aroused by particular practices" is one component in determining the constitutionality of searches.265 This component alone fails to provide a reliable method for identifying the
prevailing consensus on reasonable searches. Electoral resolution of
the Category I problem eliminates the need for courts to divine popular sentiment.266 The courts would ensure only that the people have
an opportunity to determine reasonableness by requiring that the
search be open and uniform.
Effective use of electoral power by citizens depends on citizen
knowledge of the governmental investigatory activity being reviewed,
and this knowledge results from publicity given to that activity.267
The publicity requirement is inapplicable to the limited use of secret
searches by the government. Secret searches are within the Category II or ill because they are generally beyond the control of the
electorate.
In addition, the government must conduct Category I searches uniformly to enable the electorate to assess the searches properly. Uniform application precludes arbitrary discrimination,268 and the public
Quoted in Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution ofthe
United States (pt. 2), 4 U. RicH. L. REV. 60, 69 (1969).
263. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 942, 538 P.2d 237, 246-47, 123 Cal. R_P.tr.109, 118-19
(1975) (Clark, J., dissenting, adopting opinion below of Thompson, J.) ('''Judges do
not represent people, they serve people.' ... To do so, they must not represent a political or social point of view; they must serve the rule of law.") (quoting Buchanan v.
Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (1966)).
264. Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 555.
265. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976) (the use of police roadblocks for questionin~ has a
long history evidencing its utility and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway
use).
266. See McGowan, Rule-Making and The Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 692 (1972):
"The measurement of the public temper at any one point in time is an inexact process
at best, and one for which the Supreme Court is perhaps not peculiarly qualified."
267. Publicity is essential for effective control of the government. 1 BENTHAM, JumCIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827), cited inK. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 112.
268. See notes 205-14 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (when an airline company "updated" the
F.A.A-approved hijacker profile, eliminating one criterion and adding two others, one
ethnic, the other calling for individual judgment on the :part of airline employees, the
modification destroyed ''the essential neutrality and ob3ectivity of the approved profile"); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 302 (1972): "Informed discussion about the ~rofile is difficult
because the characteristics are secret. However, these characteristics are ostensibly
based on the behavioral characteristics of embarking passengers rather than on inherited or social characteristics."
Courts have occasionally upheld roadblocks because they are uniformly applied, see
e.g, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W. 2d 686, 687 (I~r,· 1962) ("systematic and indiscriminate stopping of all motor traffic on the highway')· Although a particular roadblock is uniformly applicable to motorists encountering it, this is not the type of
uniformity proposed under the limitation perspective. Roadblocks are not uniformly
applied to an citizens or to a sufficiently large group of citizens, see note 276 in.fr.a.
Assumin~ that the uniform impact of a roadblock upon motorists using a certain highway eliminates possible discrimination against an individual member of that group, it
does not eliminate the potential for discrimination against the entire group inherent in
choosing the geographic location of the roadblock. But cf. United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (officers in the field do not choose fixed checkpoints
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will more easily recognize the oppressive use of power if the oppres-

sion is uniform.269 Public opinion rarely rises to the level of a check
on governmental power unless the public is directly affected by the
action. For example, on hearing that the government broke into an
individual's bedroom, some members of.the community would be upset because they felt that a wrong was done, and that a wrong done to
any man is a wrong done to all. Other members of the community,
however, would show less sympathy because the situation is foreign
to them and does not affect them.270 The majority of Americans, confident that the government will not conduct a similar search against
them, would condone the search in the abstract.271 If the government uniformly extends the search to all citizens,272 however, the result acceptable in the abstract could become intolerable.
The government's investigations rarely rise to the level of a Category I search. The lack of open uniform searches may well reflect
the electorate's effective exercise of control. The considerable costs
and manpower requirements of uniform searches also restrict their
use.273 Census-taking, border searches, and antiskyjacking proceoperated by the border patrol and officials responsible for making the most effective
allocation of limited enforcement resources Will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class).
269. Amsterdam, supranote 5, at 427; seenotes 259-62 supra and accompanying text.
Professor Davis reports that many Chicago police think "all society is divided into two
classes of people, the 'kinky' (criminal) class and the law-abiding class. The officers
can tell which are which by physical characteristics and appearance-mostly hair and
dress, but also the look in the eyes." K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 18. Historically,
opposition to the government's search and seizure power arises primarily when the
power is directed against those holding unpopular political beliefs, such as authors
and printers suspected of seditious libeL Stengel, supra note 19, at 283-85. In Lord
Pitt's famous speech against the general warrant he noted that government searches
to enforce the cider tax were ''particularly dangerous, when men by their birth, education, profession, very distinct from the trader, became subject to those laws." Quoted
in id. at 289.
270. See e.g~ F. CARRINGTON & w. LAMBIE, THE DEFENSELESS SOCIETY (1976).
271. See note 269 supra. For many police "[t]he working principle is that searches
of 'kinky' people for drugs and handguns are necessary and proper, whether or not the
searches would be constitutional if evidence so obtained were presented in court." K.
DAVIS, supra note 206, at 18.
272. Perhaps true uniformi~ could be achieved only if the government assigned one
officer to accompany each individual throughout life. Even then the varying abilities
of the police officers would mean less than perfect uniformity. Courts must clearly
define the contours of all three categories by answerin~ such questions as: What is
''uniformity" for Category I? What is "focus on an individual" for Category II? What
is "directed against groups or classes of people" for Category ill? See text accompanying notes 316-17 infra.
273. In addition to the check of an aroused electorate, the sheer scope of a uniform
practice would create economic limitations on the practice. See Belair & Bock, supra
note 77, at 147 (use of closed circuit television for street surveillance in Olean, New
York, was discontinued after one y_ear partly because "the small upstate community
had too little street crime to justify the costs of intensive surveillance"). See also
Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and Seizures, 62
~Y. L.J. 623, 656 (1974) (some airline officials regard the current antihijacking program
as a "costly overreaction"). Situations exist in which economic considerations do not
limit a particular practice. Stone, supra note 2, at 1238: ''The vast majority of all currently operatin~ informers and spies had agreed to serve in that capacity in order to
obtain a reduction of pending charges or some other concession in the criminal process."
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dures are among the few contemporary examples of open and uniform searches.274 Courts must scrutinize these practices for the
actual uniformity required by Category I. For example, when all airline passengers must pass through a magnetometer275 t:lie practice is
uniform; 276 when only "selectees" must pass through, the uniformity
is destroyed.277 When the search meets the requirements of openness and uniformity, the electorate can determine its reasonableness.
In the final analysis, society must distinguish between reasonable
and unreasonable governmental conduct.278

Category II: Searches Focused on an Individual Citizen
Although the majority in a democratic state may need no constitutional protection from oppressive government,279 the Constitution attempts to protect individuals and minorities from oppression.280 The
''right to be let alone"281 relates to the rights of the individual
against the group, the respective rights of minorities and majorities,
and the powers and limitations of government in its association with
individuals.282 Throughout history, civilizations have sought to limit
the power of government to acquire information about individuals,
families, and groups within society.283
Other concepts restrict the government's relations with individuals. Considerations of fair play require the government to leave the
individual alone absent good cause for disturbing him.284 The adversarial system also forecloses to the government certain methods of
investigation and interrogation.285 Finally, the imbalance between a
powerful state dealing with weak and lonely citizens, even without
official abuse, is improper.286
274. These practices arguably qualify as uniform, although no practice is perfectly
uniform. See note 272 supra.
275. The use of the magnetometer was held to be a search in United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972). But cf.United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38,
42-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (~ort searches do not invoke fourth amendment standards because their purpose is air safety regulation, and magnetometer is merely a coarsescreening device).
·
276. The practice is uniformly applied to airline passengers and not to all citizens,
i.e, those who never fly. Since perfect uniformity is probably impossible, see note 272
supra, sufficient uniformity must exist to classify the search within Category L See
text at notes 316-17 infra.
277. For a description of the selection process, referred to as the "Gate Plan," see
Brodsky, supra note 273, at 627-29.
,
278. SeeG. GILMORE, Tm: AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1977).
279. See notes 261-66 supra and accompanying text.
280. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
281. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alorn; 55 Nw. L REV. 216 (1960).
282. Dykstra, supra note 44, at 305.
283. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 22.
284. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
285. See, e.g. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967)(police lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455-58 (1966) (custodial interrogation by police without
warning of right to remain silent); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (interrogation of suspect on whom police investigation has begun to focus); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (use of surreptitious means to elicit incriminating
statements from suspect while on bail, in absence of counsel). See generallyEnker &
Elsen, supra note 5; Greenawalt, supra note 147.
286. Enker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 65. Although these general concepts of fair
play, state-individual balance, and the requirements of an adversary system have appeared most often in fifth or sixth amendment cases, they cannot be confined to those
settings. Especially in Miranda and WadE; the Court was concerned with preventing
such perceived "evils" as inherently coercive interrogations and suggestive lineups.
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Although these historical concepts may justify creating a separate
category for searches directed against individuals, the limitation perspective also supports the creation of such a category. The limitation
perspective suggests that the fourth amendment is directed at the
twin dangers of unchecked governmental search power: arbitrariness and oppression. The potential for arbitrariness and oppression
increases when the government searches a particular person, as opposed to society generally. Abuse of the search power may be intentional, but abuses also can be attributed to the lack of objectivity
created by placing the agent in an adversary position.287 Frequently,
the government's position is properly adverse to the individual's interest. Police act as adversaries to suspected wrongdoers by investigating and preventing violations of the law.288 Even when the
government properly plays the role of adversary, however, the potential for a loss of objectivity is apparent. The limitation perspective
recognizes that once the adversarial relationship arises, the fourth
amendment precludes the arbitrary exercise of governmental
power.289
Oppression is the second potential evil of unchecked governmental
power to search individuals. The danger that the state will abuse its
coercive power is greatest when a single individual is selected for
special treatment and deprived of the protection of anonymity. Depriving the individual of anonymity can cause great psychological
damage by disclosing the individual's best kept secrets and destroying his ultimate autonomy.290 Piercing the protective shell of anoThe right to counsel and the right to Miranda warnings exist not as inalienable rights
of the suspect, but because the Court has deemed them appropriate remedies for the
perceived evils. "Even when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a procedural
i'ule is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be so if suitable alternatives
are developed, or if other measures have eliminated or brought under control the evil
at which it is aimed." Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 181 {1969).
The Court also has warned that its holdings in Miranda and Wade are not intended
to create "a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform
...."Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 467; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 239 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 467). The door was left open to other remedies in
the form of legislation or administrative regulation of police departments. The Mirandawarnings are required "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused :persons of their ri~ht to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it." Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 444.
287. When the ~overnment seeks to acquire information about a specific individual
it may approach him and ask for permission to collect information. In such a situation
the individual serves as a check upon the government power and presumably would
demand a statement justifying the government's request. If the individual consents,
the purpose of the fourth amendment under the limitation perspective has been
served, because the individual has acted as an appropriate entity to review the reasonableness of the government action. If the individual withholds permission to search,
then the adversary relation between government and individual arises. Similarly, if
the government never seeks :permission from the individual, the government's interest
is usually adverse to the individual's interest.
288. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 360.
289. "[W]hen we say a decision is ad hoc, random, or unreviewable we mean in effect the decision is lawless." Wright, supra note 191, at 588.
290. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 33-34!
1Q7R1

nymity may also subject the individual to manipulation by those who
know his intimate secrets. Persons privy to this information can use
it to stifle free expression, to serve improper political purposes, or to
modify behavior. The Founding Fathers understood the need for anonymity in a system of free expression. Between 1789 and 1809, for
example, many prominent public officials published political writing
either anonymously or under pseudonyms.291 The Supreme Court
has recognized that anonymity is an important means of protecting
individuals holding unorthodox beliefs from government oppression.292 Even without government reprisal, the mere loss of anonymity may silence dissenters.293
In addition, loss of anonymity may alter the individual's conduct by
encouraging conformity. Although the government has many techniques for reprisals against heretics and rebels,294 government power
to conduct investigations and surveillance of individuals exacts conformity and acts as a form of reprisal.295 Clinical studies indicate
that few people possess the necessary courage to resist authority, especially when it is wielded by a powerful government against isolated
individuals.296 The government can easily augment its coercive powers by publicizing its investigations, because most people will infer
Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he
actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he knows to be his
much more complex reality. . . . Every individual lives behind a mask in this
manner. . • • If this mask is torn off. and the individual's real self bared to a
world in which everyone else still wears his mask and believes in masked performances, the individual can be seared by the hot light of selective, forced
exposure. The numerous instances of suicides and nervous breakdowns resulting from such exposures by government investigation, press stories, and
even published research constantly remind a free society that only grave social need can ever justify destruction of the privacy which guards the individual's ultimate autonomy.
291. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085
(1961):
The Federalist papers of Hamilton, Madison and Jay were published originally
as letters to the editor under the name of 'Publius.' The Letters of Pacificus by
Alexander Hamilton defending Washin~on's proclamation of neutrality and
Madison's answering Letters of Helvidius were published anonymously.
Even Chief Justice Marshall, writing anonymously as a 'friend to the Republic,' vigorously defended certain Supreme Court decisions against attacks by
Spencer Roane, also writing anonymously.
292. E.g, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama
ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
293. Politically active citizens could hardly remain anonymous under the present
system, se~ e.g, Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308, 309 (E.D. Va. 1971): "It has long
been the policy in Richmond and other places throughout the nation to photograph
persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities
whether peaceful or otherwise." Donohoe also suggests that such police practices "are
not only permissible and constitutional, but they are also commendable and should be
encouraged." Id at 311.
294. See notes 230-31 supra and accompanyin~ text. See also Ervin, supra note 44, at
14, noting ''the habit all governments and all societies have of surveillance, blacklisting
and subtle reprisal for unpopular political or social views."
295. Johoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Though~ 61 YALE L.J. 295,
318 (1952). For a discussion of totalitarian regimes' efforts at behavior modification
through government investigation and surveillance, see H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM 431 (1951). For a discussion of behavior modification in the United
States during the McCarthy era, see P. LAzARsFELD & W. THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC
MIND (1958).
296. Milgram, The Compulsion to Do Evi~ in PATI'ERNS OF PREJUDICE 3, 5 (Nov.-Dec.
1967).
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evil deeds from the mere fact of investigation.297 Thus, the public
prosecutor possesses awesome discretionary power to investigate citizens and to release public statements pursuant to the investigation
that adversely affect the investigated citizen's reputation.298 Any
government official with unchecked power to investigate individual
citizens poses a similar threat.299
Thus, when the government directs its power to search at individual citizens, arbitrariness and oppression are likely incidents. The
limitation perspective suggests that the fourth amendment requires
some entity to check and control such power. The general public
provides an inadequate safeguard against undisclosed governmental
conduct directed at individuals.30 ° Commentators have advocated
administrative regulation of searches and police conduct to restrain
governmental power.301 Regulations provide general rules or standards for controlling police conduct and eliminate the need for a detailed factual inquiry in recurring situations.302 These benefits
diminish when the government focuses on a single individual, and
therefore administrative regulations are inappropriate to govern
searches directed at individuals.3°3 The government should justify
its decision to investigate a particular individual because its coercive
power is strongest and most frightening when directed at particular
individuals.304 A less detailed justification, such as compliance with
a regulation, should suffice to legitimize searches conducted against
297. Comment, supra note 32, at 701: "What the innocent citizen has most reason to
fear is being singled out as the object of official suspicion." But cf. United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976): "Selective referral may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive because
of their public and relatively routine nature." In his dissenting opinion in MartinezFuerte, Justice Brennan stated: "One wonders what actual experience supports my
Brethren's conclusion that referrals 'should not be frightening or offensive .•••' " Id.
at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
298. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AMER. Jun. Soc'Y. 18, 18 (1940).
299. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 22. Professor Davis states:
[A] decision to investigate calls for further discretionary determinations of
what to investigate, what parties, by what methods, when, how broadly and
how deeply. Each facet of each question necessarily involves a separate discretionary determination. Even a negative decision has to determine what
and who will not be investigated when.
Id.
300. See notes 268-72 supra and accompanying text.
301. K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 158; Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 416-28; McGowan,
supra note 266, at 663; Wrig~t, supra note 191, at 587-93.
302. See generally Dworkin, supra note 2.
303. Administrative rem.tlations are appropriate to govern searches against groups,
however. See notes 318-60 infra and accompanying text.
304. The individual has a right to ask whether "the Government has good grounds
for singling him out for_ special scrutiny." Christie, supra note 77, at 886. When two
individuals are treated differently the government agent authorizing or conducting the
search
should be able to point to some distinction between the two cases which it is
permissible for him to consider. While he may not be able to articulate in
advance what all the distinguishing factors in all cases will be, he must at least
be able to show later that cases treated differently were in fact different in
some relevant respect-that is, that he is following some sort of rational, nondiscriminatory rule. If he cannot make such a showing, his different treat1n1701
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groups of citizens,305 or against the citizenry as a whole.306
When the government conducts a search of an individual, the appropriate fourth amendment check is the warrant clause and the recognized exceptions to it. Magistrates, in issuing or denying
warrants, and the courts, in determining whether a warrantless
search is constitutional, are the appropriate entities to control the
government's power to search individual citizens. Only magistrates
and courts can effectively check governmental imposition on individuals because the general public often is unwilling, and the drafters of
administrative regulations usually are unable, to consider meaningfully the unique facts of each search focused on an individual citizen.
Definitions are necessary for two terms integral to analysis of
searches focused on individuals, "focus" and ''individual." The focus
test of Escobedo v. Illinow 07 enjoyed a short period of prominence
until Miranda v. Arizona308 overruled it by implication. The
Supreme Court has recently disposed of the focus concept in police
interrogation cases.309 The Court can nevertheless use the focus test
effectively in fourth amendment cases.
Although criticism of the focus test of Escobedo centered on its
vagueness,310 this criticism applies to any principle until the principle has been interpreted and employed in specific fact situations.311
Further judicial interpretation could refine the focus concept for use
in moderating searches directed at individuals.312 The vagueness of
the Escobedo focus test resulted primarily from the Court's failure to
consider the proper perspective from which to define ''focus." If
some subjective standard is chosen, the state of mind of the police on
the one hand, or of the suspect on the other, are alternatives. Inquiries into subjective thoughts and motivations of police officers and
ment of the two cases is irrational or invidious, and hence violative of equal
protection.
Wright, supra note 191, at 594. Although Judge Wright was referring to prosecutors,
the same standard should apply to police officers who exercise a similar discretion:
In our entire system of law and government, the greatest concentrations of
unnecessary discretionary J?OWer over individual parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and prosecutors. . . . The police are among the
most important policy-makers of our entire society. And they make far more
discretionary determinations in individual cases than any other class of administrators; I know of no close second.
K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 222.
305. See notes 318-60 infra and accompanying text.
306. See notes 254-78 supra and accompanying text.
307. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Regarding the focus problem, the Court in Escobedo stated:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the mvestigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has re~uested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied ''the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . .
Id. at 490-91.
308. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
309. E.g~ Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
310. SeeEnker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 70-77.
311. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 352; LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution.· Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 68 (1968).
312. LaFave, supra note 311, at 46 n.28.
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suspects would probably be fruitless. 313 By defining search as any
government activity intended or likely to produce information about
citizens, courts could solve these problems of perspective.314 The
courts could then apply an objective standard except in cases where
the searcher's subjective intent is clear.315
The remaining definitional problem for Category II searches is the
term "individual." Courts need not limit application of Category II
standards to searches directed at the solitary citizen,316 but also may
apply these standards to searches directed against two, three, or
more specified individuals. Category I and Category II searches are
easily distinguishable. When the government activity is not applied
uniformly to all citizens, some focusing of the search power is readily
apparent. Distinguishing between Categories II and III is more difficult. If the government directs a search at some identifiable class or
group, the court must determine whether the group is sufficiently
large that the safeguards of Category III should attach, or whether
the group is so small that the more stringent safeguards of Category
II should apply. Courts will encounter situations in which the line is
difficult to draw, but can generally distinguish Category II and Category III searches by considering the relative adequacy of the checks
on the government's power to search.317 Even if a court improperly
categorizes a particular factual situation, the limitation perspective
guarantees some fourth amendment protection against arbitrary and
oppressive government action to each category. In contrast, a court
invoking the individual perspective to determine that a given action
is not a search eliminates all fourth amendment protections.

Category III: Searches Directed Against Groups or Classes of
Citizens
Category III occupies the large middle ground between Category I,
open and uniform searches, and Category II, searches focused on in313. See note 236 supra.
314. See text accompanying note 239 supra.
315. This objective approach is apparently the direction the lower courts were taking in interpreting Escobedo, see Enker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 70.
316. Nor is the suggested definition of focus limited to situations in which the government has selected a named or identifiable/erson. Random selections, such as
spot checks for enfori:ing auto registration an licensing requirements, would be a
form of focus under the proposed focus concept. Cf. State v. Kabayama, 9B N.J.
Super. B5, BB, 236 A.2d 164, 166 (App. Div. 1967) ( [t)he temporary stoppage of vehicles
upon the highways, either singly or as a part of a check by means of a roadblock procedure" is a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate its highways).
317. Courts can base the line between Category II and Category m searches on
general considerations in defining a "sufficiently large group" versus an ''isolated individual." While the line ultimately drawn may be somewhat arbitrary, the limitation
perspective obviates the detailed factual inquiry characteristic of the individual perspective. See generallyDworkin, supra note 2.
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dividuals. Category III procedures determine the reasonableness of
the government's efforts to acquire information about members of a
group or class of people. Police frequently justify searches focused
on members of groups or classes by contending that their conduct is
a necessary and proper police practice in these situations. For example, the high statistical frequency of injury inflicted on policemen
by armed traffic violators suggests that all motorists who are stopped
or arrested should be searched for weapons.318 The police contend,
therefore, that a weapons search incident to a traffic stop is a routine
procedure necessary for police safety and is accordingly reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Courts have been inconsistent in assessing the reasonableness of
particular searches, sometimes emphasizing routine police procedures and other times emphasizing the unique factual situation.319
Although an emphasis on particular facts may reflect proper judicial
restraint and is consistent with a view of the fourth amendment as a
guarantor of individual rights, this approach emasculates the fourth
amendment as a means of checking government power.320 The limitation perspective suggests that the fourth amendment, as enforced
by the exclusionary rule, primarily regulates day-to-day police activities321 and its requirements must therefore be clear to individual officers. By emphasizing complex factual settings in fourth
amendment decisions, however, courts fail to express general rules
or principles that police officers can readily understand.322 A diligent officer familiar with Supreme Court cases and striving to follow
the Court's lead may know how to react to a factual situation similar
to that presented in Katz v. United States. 323 Nevertheless, the officer is probably unable to extract guiding principles from these
cases to help him deal with the multitude of dissimilar situations
arising in the course of his day-to-day activities.324
Courts cannot, however, formulate guiding fourth amendment
principles, even assuming that their institutional role would permit
it.325 They lack an understanding of the day-to-day problems of law
enforcement and their only source of information is the particular

318. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
319. This swing back and forth from routine procedures to specific facts has been
most apparent in cases involving automobile searches. Compare Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
320. The assumption "that fourth amendment law can develop meaningfully on a
case by case basis, and which finds great significance in differing factual situations, is
an abysmal failure." Dworkin, supra note 2, at 334.
321. LaFave, supra note 4, at 141.
322. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. REV. 987 (1965). The authors
cite Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), as a prime example of an opinion that is
"not written in a way which makes it easy for the police to understand what they are
expected to do." Id at 1007.
323. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), discussed at notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
324. The individual officer is unlikely to receive much help from police agencies,
which have made few attempts to congeal judicial decisions dealing with aspects of
police investigations into a systematic outline of policy, procedures, and rules. N.A.C.
Por..rcE, supra note 193, at 25. See also LaFave & Remington, supra note 322, at 1008.
325. SeeAshwanderv. TVA, 297U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (discussing judicial restraint).
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record before them in a given case. In contrast, police administrative
officials, having acquired expertise and perspective on law enforcement, are competent to draft generalized search and seizure rules.326
Delegating this kind of rulemaking power to police administrators
has several advantages. The individual officer ceases to be burdened
with the complex task of interpreting court decisions, and is freed to
follow the department policies and rules in which he has been
trained.327 Moreover, because of internal disciplinary measures, he is
more likely to follow agency rules than to follow the present vague
judicial guidelines.328 By giving agency administrators an interest in
enforcing their own rules rather than rules judicially imposed on
them, supervision of police conduct would improve.329 Disregarding
whether the rulemaking process can replace the exclusionary rule,330
the process has many advantages over the exclusionary rule as a
method of regulating the conduct of individual officers.
To date, courts have failed to show proper respect for administrative rules promulgated by police officials, even when the courts have
dealt with routine police procedures. Courts reviewing the constitutionality of routine police procedures have addressed the merits of
these procedures without attaching significance to their origin.331

326. Some examples of police rules are set out in the Appendix to N.A.C. POLICE,
supra note 193.
327. "If ~olice agencies fail to establish policy guidelines, officers are forced to establish thell" own policy based on their understanding of the law and perception of the
police role." N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at 23. Policy should "emanate from the
administrative level of the police hierarchy instead of from the operational level." Id
at 25.
328. McGowan, supra note 266, at 673:
The police, organized in a semi-military tradition, work in that tradition's responsiveness to going by the book, which is always less grudging if one has
had a role in writing the book. The physical structure of the police is also
directed towards discipline for failure to follow explicit commands from above.
329. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970): "[T]he Supreme Court, like any other court, lacks the
sort of supervisory power over the practices of the police that is possessed by the chief
of police or the district attorney." Administrative rules would also have a much wider
scope than the present exclusionary rule, and would cover incidents not followed by
prosecution. K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 127: ''The greatest advantage of required police rulemaking over the exclusionary rule is that the exclusionary rule reaches only
two or three percent of ~olice activities, whereas required police rulemaking can reach
almost all policy activities."
330. The Court has noted contemporary dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule as a means of regulating police conduct. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), and cases cited therein. This article is confined to an examination of
the positive benefits of rulemaking as one means of regulating police conduct. It does
not address the question of whether the rulemaking process should constitute an alternative to the exclusionary rule, see McGowan, supra note 266, at 690, or an additional
means of controllin~ police conduct. That question requires detailed consideration of
whether the exclusion of evidence is a constitutional requirement or a judicially created remedy. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621.
331. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) with Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). In Robinson, the police officer followed written regulations,

Thus the courts have failed to distinguish among procedures embodied in a written administrative rule or directive,332 vague unwritten
rules of practice,333 and mere post hoc rationalizations for unfounded
practices.334
When a written directive exists, the police agency has methodically
considered, articulated, and adopted the rule.335 If, on the other
hand, the police practice is vague or nonexistent, the court must act
as a rulemaker of first instance. In so doing, the court subjects itself
to the criticism that it is preoccupied with policing the police and that
it is improperly qualified to write police manuals.336 The courts' willingness to consider police conduct that supposedly conforms to an
unwritten or nonexistent rule eliminates the checks on power inherent in the process of administrative rulemaking.337 Commentators
have explored the benefits of police rulemaking in great detaiI.338
The rulemaking process is consistent with the fourth amendment
as viewed from the limitation perspective. The limitation perspective suggests that limiting and controlling arbitrary and oppressive
use of the search power is an important fourth amendment value.
Search and seizure rulemaking is implied by the limitation perspective because rules are necessary to guarantee equity and fairness to
target individuals.339
Category ill procedures and criteria of reasonableness therefore
require that government searches conform to written rules promulgated by the government agency conducting the search.340 This requirement facilitates judicial review of the constitutionality of a

whereas in Gustafson, the arresting officer acted discretionarily or pursuant to an unwritten routine practice. The Court failed to make this distinction although the cases
were considered simultaneously.
332. E.g. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
333. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
334. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 420.
335. At present most procedure and policy are "made primarily by patrolmen, the
least qualified." K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 165.
336. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
337. "Recognition that police policy formulation is an administrative process suggests the applicability to it of administrative procedures found serviceable in other
contexts." Amsterdam, supra note 329, at 813 (emphasis in original). Cf. Gellhorn &
Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (1975)
(limiting police discretion is difficult because of the numerous variables in each decision, the level of the hierarchy at which decisions are made, and their low visibility).
338. See, e.g. K. DAVIS, supra note 66; K. DAVIS, supra note 206; McGowan, supra
note 266; Wright, supra note 191.
339. L. F'uLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (rev. ed. 1969). See also K. DAVIS, supra
note 66, in which the author discusses the basic question
that legal philosophers have pondered for thousands of years: In our entire
legal and governmental system, how can we improve the quality of justice for
individual parties; how can we reduce injustice? Over the centuries, the main
answer has been to build a system of rules and principles to guide decisions in
individual cases.
Id at 215.
340. Police rulemaking may be voluntary, legislatively required or court-ordered.
For a discussion of the possible legal foundations of court-ordered rulemaking, see
Wright, supranote 191, at 592-93. See alsoK. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 131-38; Amsterdam, supra note 329, at 812-14. With respect to the fourth amendment, police rules
governing searches and seizures could be required as part of the constitutional definition of a reasonable search.
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search,341 and utilizes the searching agency itself as an important
check against arbitrary or oppressive exercise of the power to
search.342 Even under this proposed system of police rulemaking,
the police do not serve as the ultimate check on their own power.343
Written administrative regulations are simply an initial limitation of
power with subsequent judicial review344 guaranteeing that the investigative agency has acted lawfully.345
Many important benefits would result from requiring an agency to
limit its use of power by promulgating its own administrative rules.
The drafting process encourages rationality and circumspection.346
Administrative standards for searches are certainly preferable to the
frequently capricious decisions of individual officers.347
The rulemaking process must be mandatory and visible to check
the powers of police agencies effectively.348 If police departments
demonstrate reluctance to draft rules or draft ineffective rules, 349
courts can require35o police administrators to draft rules with sufficient detail and specificity to limit discretion and reduce the poten341. The requirement for written rules reduces the dangers inherent in vague rules
of thumb and precludes the danger of after the fact rationalization, see text accompanying notes 327-30 supra.
In reviewing such a rule, one court stated:
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Department
put into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scene identification confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged
offense and in close proximity to the scene. We see in this regulation a careful and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a
confrontation against its inherent suggestiveness, and to balance both factors
against the need to pick up the trail while fresh if the suspect is not the offender. We see no need for interposing at this time any more rigid time standard by judicial declaration.
United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
342. "Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of
administrative rule-making by policy agencies." AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION § 4.3 (1973). See
also N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, Standard 1.3.
343. This concern is expressed by Dworkin, supra note 2, at 344: "The fourth
amendment exists to control the government. It is folly to let the controlled dictate
the terms by which they will be regulated."
344. See notes 356-60 infra and accompanying text.
345. ''The last word as to the propriety of police-made rules always remains with the
judicial branch." McGowan, supra note 266, at 675.
346. McGowan, supra note 266, at 680. See alsoN.A.C. POLICE, supranote 193.
347. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 606, 219 N.E.2d 196, 198, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377
(1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) ("frisking a suspect .•• can be done in practice'
(though not in theory) at the officer's whim"), rev'~ 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
348. "Department-wide policies, as distinct from the individual conduct of police officers, can be adequately controlled only from outside a police department." Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police· Authority, 58 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 164 (1967).
349. Most existing police manuals "never discuss . . • the hard choices a policeman
must make every day: whether or not to break up a sidewalk gathering, whether or not
to intervene in a domestic dispute, whether or not to silence a street corner speaker
••.•"PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103 (1967).
350. "[W]hile all branches of ~overnment must join in the fight to limit discretion, I
believe it is the courts which will have to bear the primary burden." Wright, supra
note 191, at 581. See note 340 infra.
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tial for arbitrariness.351 Judicial insistence on detailed and visible
rules will also ensure a role for public opinion in checking the
agency's power. The more specific the rules, the more likely that
segments of the public will critique the rules. For example, if the
police promulgate a rule that officers will or will not shoot looters
during a riot, "law and order" groups will represent one viewpoint,
and "libertarian" groups will represent the opposing viewpoint. Although conflicting public input may complicate the rulemaking process for administrators,352 it is a necessary part of a democratic society
and constitutes an important check upon unfettered discretion.353
Visibility of police rulemaking to the public and the courts would
help ensure that the police act reasonably, would not unduly hamper
efficiency,354 and could benefit the police by enhancing public awareness and understanding of the difficulties encountered in law enforcement.355
Although courts would remain the ultimate restraint on the government's power to search,356 judicial review would examine the validity
of the rules rather than the reasonableness of every search on the
facts of every case. Courts would cease to be the rulemaker of first
instance.357 Emphasis on general policies appears inconsistent with
the warrant clause requirement that probable cause be established
with specificity, but the Supreme Court has relaxed the specificity
requirement in certain situations.358 Relaxation is also appropriate
for searches directed at broad groups or classes. Compliance with
administrative rules in searches directed at groups or classes fulfills
the same policies underlying the specificity requirement for searches
351. For a discussion of how meaningful rules can be drafted, see K. DAVIS, supra
note 206, at 145-49. But cf. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative LaU\
88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1701 (1975) (inability of formal rules to affect policy choices).
352. The public's interest in the rule must be balanced against the agency's interest
in economy and efficiency, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-67 (1970).
353. But cf. Stewart, supra note 351, at 1775:
[P]ublic interest advocates have tended to scorn resort to rulemaking P.roceedings on the ground that participation in such proceedings may have little
impact on agency policy determinations. In notice and comment rulemaking
the agency is not bound by the comments filed with it, and many such comments may be ignored or given short shrift.
354. Certainly, other administrative agencies have managed to live with the notice
and comment procedure, and "[m]uch experience shows that the procedure is efficient, fair, democratic, and easy." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 241 (6th ed. 1977).
Of course, the benefits of airing certain police rules and procedure in public are sometimes outweighed by the need for secrecy. See K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 74; LaFave,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33-34.
355. See, e.g. N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at 9: 'The ultimate goal toward which
[these] standards are directed is greater public trust in the police and a resulting reduction in crime through public cooperation." See also McGowan, supra note 266, at
663.
356. McGowan, supra note 266, at 686.
357. SeeK. DAVIS, supranote 66, at 186; LaFave &Remington, supranote 322, at 1011.
358. "[T] he Court has now made clear what was left in doubt in Frank: periodic and
area inSJ;>ections, based on general facts instead of on evidence indicating a probability
of violation in a particular building, are constitutionally permissible." LaFave, supra
note 354, at 36. 'The probable cause needed to justify issuance of a warrant for inspection is not to depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the building in question but may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building, or the
condition of the entire area." Id at 10.
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directed against mdividuals.359 The policy underpinning the requirment that police establish probable cause before a magistrate is that
post hoc rationalizations for the search are undesirable.360 Promulgating written procedures requires the rulemaking agency to answer
the same questions generally that an individual officer must answer
specifically whenever he obtains a warrant. Deliberation prior to
promulgation determines the scope of the search and articulates a
rational basis for the search. Thus, judicial review of formal police
policy regulating searches against groups or classes constitutes an
adequate check on power for purposes of the limitation perspective.

Conclusion
This article has discussed two ways to analyze the fourth amendment, and has offered the limitation perspective as a distinct, theoretical alternative to the right of privacy. These alternatives are
separable for purposes of exposition,361 but in practice courts must
accommodate both policies, regulation of government power and
preservation of privacy rights, in fourth amendment decisions. This
task is not impossible. By emphasizing the flexibility of the fourth
amendment,362 courts could recognize an absolute right to privacy in
certain situations,363 a requirement for police to obtain a search warrant in others,364 and a general concept of reasonableness to limit
government power in still others.365 The Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule366 clearly has eroded the legiti-

359. In the context of a search focused on an individual, ''it is the function of the
magistrate to weigh the facts of the particular case and detennine whether it is probable that an offense has been committed and that certain seizable items connected with
that offense are to be found at a specified place." LaFave, supra note 354, at 23. The
typical magistrate is probably incapable of assessing the complex factors that arise in
Category m searches. For example, under what circumstances may a police department assign additional patrolmen to a selected area in order to obtain information regarding groups within that area? Perhaps the most volatile issue is whether police
may or do assign additional patrolmen to the "ghetto" because the crime rate is statistically higher there than in other locations, see Washington v. United States, 397 F.2d
705, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1968), or whether police departments provide less protection to certain areas because of their racial composition, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 307-09 (1968).
360. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
361. Goodhart, supra note 196, at 945.
362. See text accompan~g notes 241-46 supra.
363. SeeFisherv. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976); Note, supra note 181, at
985-91.
364. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (government intrusion into private dwelling).
365. Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967), with Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
366. See generally Hufstedler, supra note 40. But ef. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 329.
Dworkin cautions against ''the easy assumption that rejecting the exclusionary rule
will solve the problems of fourth amendment jurisprudence.... [A]ny sanction, any
remedy, is only as good as the substantive law it enforces. The problem with the
search and seizure cases lies with the substance, not the remedy." Id at 333.
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macy of the limitation perspective. Nevertheless, acceptance of the
historical and theoretical validity of the limitation perspective and a
recognition of the conceptual problems inherent in the individual
perspective367 can eliminate judicial reluctance to regulate government action by using the fourth amendment.

367. See notes 174-79 supra and accompanying text.
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